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Introduction
This article links the economic sanctions enacted by the United States and
the internal compliance functions of non-American banks.' Whereas
scholars have recently investigated either aspect, 2 only a few have drawn a
connection between them.3 At the moment of writing, and to our
knowledge, no scholar has proposed a comprehensive view of the corporate
compliance of banks operating outside the territory of the United States, and
in Europe especially, regarding the U.S. economic sanctions arsenal as a
whole, including the extraterritoriality problem.4
* Assistant Professor, Law & Tax Department, HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Liberation, 78351
Jouy-en-Josas, France, restrepo-amariles@hec.fr.
** Assistant Professor, Law & Tax Department, HEC Paris, 1 rue de la Liberation, 78351
Jouy-en-Josas, France, winkler@hec.fr. The Authors are grateful to Robert W. Emerson and
Darren Rosenblum for their fruitful comments, and to Francesco Montanaro, Mike Videler,
and Tomas Manguel for their help in the drafting and review process. An early version of this
article was presented at research seminars in SciencesPo, Paris, and the Perelman Center at the
Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles.
1. For a general overview of the compliance-related aspects of U.S. economic sanctions, see
Paul L. Lee, Compliance Lessons from OFAC Case Studies Part , 131 BANKING L. J. 657, 657
(2014), and Paul L. Lee, Compliance Lessonsfrom OFAC Case Studies PartII, 131 BANKING L. J.
717, 717 (2014).
2. See in this respect Georges Affaki, L'Extraterritorialitien Droit Bancaire [Extraterritoriality
in Banking Law], REVUE DE DROIT BANCAIRE ET FINANCIER 90, 90 (2015), according to which,
"[tihe extraterritoriality of banking law raises complex questions of conflict of laws and
jurisdictions, public policy, mandatory rules and international management of banking
transactions." Id. at 90. He does not mention the related implications for corporate
compliance. See id.
3. Actually, "[m]any financial institutions, mindful that U.S. federal and state banking
regulations mandate AML [anti-money laundering] compliance programs, focus nearly all of
their compliance attention in fighting money laundering, while leaving scant attention or
resources for other areas, such as sanctions, anti-boycott [and] export controls. . . ." Gregory
Husisian, U.S. Regulation ofInternationalFinancialInstitutions: It's Time for an IntegratedApproach
to Compliance, 127 BANKING L. J. 195, 197 (2010). French jurists Garapon and ServantSchreiber have recently edited an excellent monograph on the hegemony of American law in
international business viewed from a French perspective. See ANTOINE GARAPON & PIERRE
SERVAN-SCHREIBER,

DEALS

DE

JUSTICE:

LE

MARCHE

AMERICAIN

DE

L'OBEISSANCE

(2013).
4. An isolated exception to this statement might be identified with the work of the Parisian
independent and Harvard-educated attorney Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, who however does not
address the problem, dealt with in Part III of this article, of the reform of the compliance
MONDIALISSE
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In the first place, a tension exists between the extraterritorial application
and enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions on the one hand, and corporate
compliance on the other. In fact, "[w]ith the penalties for non-compliance
[with such sanctions] high, and the potential sanctions severe, banks need to
exercise an abundance of caution in their dealings both at home and
abroad."5 This might not be an obvious task for non-U.S. compliance
officers, who usually operate in a predominantly domestic environment and
are typically not familiar with U.S. laws.6 While most of them have studied
in the United States and preside over transactions with the United States on
a daily basis, they remain skeptic about the real reach of U.S. sanctions.7
Also, because the economic sanctions of the kind enacted by the United
States and the powerful enforcement tools that support them find no
correspondence in Europe or elsewhere, such compliance officers remain
convinced that they commit no wrong in breaching such sanctions, creating
a loophole in their own firm's compliance culture.8 Disregarding them,
functions of non-U.S. banks.

See

LAURENT

COHEN-TANUGI,

THE EXTRATERRITORIAL

5 (2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.2576678 (describing the links between the French bank BNP Paribas and the U.S. legal
APPLICATION OF AMERICAN LAW: MYTHS AND REALITIEs

system).

5. Steven A. Meyerowitz, Compliance is Key, 131

BANKING

L. J. 655, 655 (2014).

6. Such corporate officers are of two kinds. On the one hand, there are "in-house lawyers
acting as corporate counsel [and] carry[ing] out a wide range of duties within and on behalf of

the firm." Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of
Compliance, 53 AM. Bus. L. J. 203, 203 (2016). In particular, "it is the in-house counsel who
must organize regular meetings to evaluate the company's level of compliance, write up the
regular reports documenting the level of compliance, conduct interviews on a regular basis with
those responsible for the various corporate functions, and so it goes on." U. DRAETTA, ON THE
SIDE OF IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 30 (2012). These lawyers are "responsible to the CEO for the
company's compliance with the laws governing its various business activities as well as
identifying and evaluating the legal risks facing the company as a whole." Id. at 46. On the
other hand, there are compliance professionals [who] "design and implement compliance
processes, investigate misconduct, and serve as a neutral fact finder[s] whose duties transcend
the practice of law." Bird & Park, supra, at 205.
For the purpose of this article, the distinction between the legal and the compliance functions
is left aside, based upon the consideration that, even if they remain separated in many firms'
structure, "[a] long history of collaboration between Legal and Compliance ... [can] cultivate[]

and strengthen[] compliance risk management within the organization." Thomas C. Baxter, Jr.
& Won B. Chai, EnterpriseRisk Management: Where is Legal and Compliance?, 133 BANKING L. J.
3, 13 (2016). Moreover, "[e]very organization is unique, and so is the role played in each by the
General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer . . . [who] have already integrated themselves
into the organization's risk management, whether or not a formal risk management framework

is in place." Id. at 15.
7. See Jaclyn Jaeger, BNP ParibasDebacle Offers Lessons in Compliance,

COMPLIANCE WEEK

July 22, 2014), https://www.complianceweek.com/news/news-article/bnp-paribas-debacleoffers-lessons-in-compliance#.WxbEhdMvyu4 (arguing that non-American compliance officers
"have their own cultural tendencies or skepticism about the reach of U.S. laws or the purpose of
U.S. sanctions.").
8. See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Reflections on the new compliance landscape July 23, 2014), http:/
/www.bis.org/review/rl40731d.htm,
"[s]ome European [firms] almost naturally adopted the
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however, may cost European banks hundreds of millions of dollars-perhaps
even billions-in fines and loss of reputation. As we will see, examples of
this sort abound in practice. Scholars have dubbed these violations
"spectacular failures" in compliance.9
Remarkably, the banks that were accused of such "spectacular failures"
decided to settle with U.S. authorities, in some instances pleading guilty, and
committed to reform their compliance functions according to the standards
suggested by the U.S. government. 0 In fact, because compliance officers
proved crucial in triggering the investigations of the U.S. authorities, either
for being unable to change their practices or for complying with the
violators, they inevitably became part of the tools used to remedy the wrongs
committed." On the other hand, the reform efforts put forward by foreign
banks can be seen as the sign of a broader need to rethink the compliance
functions with respect to the extraterritoriality of U.S. economic sanctions,
even in industries other than banking.12 As a scholar argued in this regard,
"[g]iven the extensive nature of some of the economic sanctions programs
administered by the [U.S. government], the precise effect on those [banking]
interests may manifest itself in unexpected ways, thus constituting a
dangerous trap for the unwary."13 Compliance officers should not find
themselves unprepared.
This article addresses these problems in three parts. Part I describes the
legal background of the U.S. economic sanctions arsenal, with a focus on its
history and more recent enforcement by the U.S. government.' 4 Part II
illustrates the failures in the compliance offices of the banks investigated by
U.S. authorities for violation of U.S. economic sanctions.15 Finally, Part III
concludes with a "macro-compliance" analysis,16 examining the reforms that
view that there was no value system underlying the technical American legal rule. They looked
at economic sanctions as technical 'American' rules that were not seen as consistent with the
organization's and the home country's larger value system . . . . In Europe, they found no
similar sanctions, and there it was perfectly legal at the time to do business with these
sanctioned jurisdictions." Id. "This failure to correlate the rule with the value is root of real
mischief. It erodes what some commentators call the 'culture of compliance', and it tends to
foster an employee population that will be inclined to look for loopholes, to place toes on the
edge of the permissible, or even to turn a blind eye to a black letter compliance rule." Id.
9. John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20

N.C.

BANKING INST.

17, 53 (2016).

10. Karen Freifeld, Aruna Viswanatha, & Steve Slater, BNP said to move compliance operations to
U.S. as settlement nears, REUTERS: Bus. NEws (June 24, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-bnp-paribas-compliance/exclusive-bnp-said-to-move-compliance-operations-to-u-s-as-settle
ment-nears-idUSKBN0EZ2S820140624.
11. See id.
12. See Michael P. Malloy, U.S. International Banking and Treasury's Foreign Assets
Controls: Springing Traps for the Unwary, 8 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 181, 183 (1989).
13. Id. at 183.
14. See discussion infra Part I.
15. See discussion infra Part II.
16. 'While "micro-compliance" relates to "those technical, unambiguous regulatory
requirements and prohibitions that most people would instantly recognise as compliance issues
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the targeted banks have put into place as a result of these investigations. We
will focus mostly on European banks, which are those who have been
investigated most vigorously by U.S. authorities. As this final part will show,
such reforms changed the structure and philosophy underlying compliance
offices of European banks to the point that it is possible to argue that an
Americanization of compliance is currently underway.
I.

The Legal Arsenal of U.S. Economic Sanctions

Part I addresses the general legal arsenal of U.S. economic sanctions, with
attention to their extraterritorial enforcement. Through a short description
of the various components of this arsenal at constitutional, statutory and
regulatory levels, this Part recounts the history of economic sanctions
enacted by the United States, including the various amendments enacted
over time (section A). More specifically, even though the U.S. government
has made particularly intense efforts regarding economic sanctions
enforcement as part of its foreign policy towards several countries, it is
regarding the sanction regime against Sudan, Iran and Cuba that such efforts
have been strengthened in the last decade in respect of the activity of foreign
corporations in the bank industry (section B). The enforcement thereof
usually takes the form of either a criminal prosecution, with the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) in charge of the investigation, or civil penalty
proceedings under the control of the Treasury Department's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), or even both (section C). Once it is
targeted by the DOJ and/or the OFAC, the foreign corporations can actually
negotiate the amount of the final sanction by adopting a cooperative attitude
that helps both them and the U.S. government to mitigate the costs and the
consequences of a potential criminal trial (section D).
A.

HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF

U.S.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Even though scholars traditionally identify the first statutory source of
economic sanctions in the Trade with the Enemy Act (TWEA), a law enacted
in 1917 at the verge of the United States' entry into World War I, the use of
economic sanctions is deeply rooted in American history since its very
beginning.7
([e.g.],

the requirement to perform client identification procedures under anti-money

laundering . . . legislation) . . . 'macro-compliance' [relates to] those governance-like rules or

regulatory expectations, often expressed in principles-based language, that deal with broad
concepts such as supervision, oversight, the management of reputational or operational risk and
ethics." Mark D. Pratt, 'Macro-Compliance'Obligations in InternationalFinancial Institutions, 9
Bus. L. INT'L 181, 181 - 82 (2008).
17. See Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 95a - 95b and 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 - 44); see also Timothy Zick, Territorialityand the
FirstAmendment: Free Speech - and Beyond - Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAx-ME L. REV. 1543, 1563

(2010) (noticing that "[m]uch of the modern legal and regulatory architecture for the regulation
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At the time of the American Revolution and its immediate aftermath, a
well-established norm of the law of nations was already commonly
recognized as entitling belligerents to restrict trade with the countries they
were at war with.'s According to this norm, "[e]nemies are enemies in every
respect, including trade . . . ."19 The United States made frequent use of its
rights in such respect, especially in its turbulent relations with Great
Britain.20 In particular, as Justice Joseph Story stated referring to the War of
1812,21 "[when] [t]he whole nation [is] embarked in one common bottom ...
[e]very individual of the one nation must acknowledge every individual of
the other nation as his own enemy because [the other is] the enemy of his
country. It is not necessary to quote the authorities on this subject," Story
concluded, "[as] they are numerous, explicit, respectable, and have been ably
commented upon the argument."22 Simultaneously, the same international

law norm was explicitly acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
affirmed that "in war all intercourse between the subjects and citizens of the
belligerent countries is illegal, unless sanctioned by the authority of the
government . . . ."23 Blockade and export restrictions were subsequently

of information flow at the national borders was construed during and as a direct response to
World War I.").
18. See The InternationalLaw of Embargo and Reprisal, 24 LAW MAG. QUART. REV. JURIS. 73,
73 - 79 (1840).
19. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 89 (1985).
20. While the American Revolution itself was the result of a boycott over English goods as a
retaliation against the Stamp Act 1765, "[b]etween 1794 and 1809, Congress enacted various
statutes that vested discretion with the president to impose embargoes on all ships and vessels in
US ports and to suspend or restrict trade on commercial relations with other countries." KERN
ALEXANDER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 13 (2009).
2 1. Such a war against England itself was caused by the rupture of economic relations between
the two countries due to Britain's involvement in the Napoleonic Wars. See SYLVIA ELLIS,
HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONs 5 (2009). In 1807 President
Thomas Jefferson persuaded Congress to enact the Embargo Act, thereby prohibiting trade
with Britain. See id. at 5 - 6. Jefferson had a profound knowledge of international law as he
studied and often used to quote the works of prominent international lawyers of past and
contemporary Europe, including Hugo Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel. See Louis Martin Sears,
Jefferson and the Law of Nations, 13 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 379, 384(1919). He also "pronounced in
favor of commercial retaliation as an efficient substitute for war." Id. at 394. Jefferson himself
declared that "[w]ar is not the best engine for us to resort to, nature has given us one in our
commerce, which if properly managed will be a better instrument for obliging the interested
nations of Europe to treat us with justice." Douglas J. Sylvester, InternationalLaw as Sword or
Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 54
(1999). Moreover, "the embargo during Jefferson's administration proved a tremendously
powerful weapon. . . ." Charles Wiltse, ThomasJefferson on the Law of Nations, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 66, 80 (1935). "Recent researches in the French and British archives of the period reveal that
it was far more effective than either its friends or its enemies realized at the time." Id.
22. The Rapid, 12 U.S. 155, 161 (1814).
23. The Julia, 12 U.S. 181, 193 (1814).
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applied during the Civil War (1861-1865) and the Spanish-American War
(1898).24
As part of this development, the TWEA of 1917 does represent the first
example of modern U.S. economic sanctions legislation.25 Legal historians
connect the American TWEA with the homonymic British war regulations
of 1915-1916, which introduced a comprehensive system of sanctions against
Germany, including blacklisting persons and entities of third countries
suspected of acting in the interest of Germany.26 But, the hurdles of war and
the necessities of economic warfare soon required an expansion of both the
blacklist and the listing criteria.27
The TWEA's key provision resides in section 5(b), which confers on the
President the prerogative to "investigate, regulate or prohibit, under such
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by means of licenses or otherwise,
any transactions . . . ."28
hile such a broad power was naturally granted for
the entire duration of the war, the TWEA was not formally abolished with
the peace treaty and the presidential powers established therein remained
24. Indeed, "[e]mbargoes have been imposed during every war fought by the United States,
with the exception of the Mexican." Constitutionality of Export Controls, 76 YALE L. J. 200, 202
n.7 (1966).
25. When the TWEA was enacted, the common law already prohibited trading with the
enemy. See Thomas Ewing, The "Tradingwith the Enemy" Act, 6 GEO. L. J. 4, 4 (1917 - 1918)
(noting that "[a]t Common Law trade with an enemy is forbidden. The purpose of the 'Trading
with the Enemy' Act is to give statutory definitions to 'trading,' 'enemy,' and 'ally of enemy;' to
fix appropriate penalties for violation of law; to provide for the administration of the law, and to
confer upon the Executive the authority in proper case to permit any prohibited act.").
26. See Alexander, supra note 20, at 15. The law in question was the Trading with the Enemy
(Extension of Powers) Act of Dec. 3, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 98, briefly commented on in 60
SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 167 (1916)), which was preceded by the Trading with the Enemy Act
of Sept. 18, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 87, published in 58 SOLIC. J. & WKLY. REP. 842 (1914)),
which declared "enemies" all persons and firms residing in enemy territory regardless of their
nationality. See Karl Zemanek, Economic Warfare, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, USE OF FORCE, WAR AND NEUTRALITY PEACE TREATIES 157, 160
(Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 2014). In addition to that, "in order to cope with the interweaving of
neutral and enemy businesses, [the Act of 1915] made enemy connection the relevant criterion
and empowered the Crown to penalize all transactions between British subjects and 'statutory
alien enemies,' of whatever nationality and wherever resident, who were named in 'black lists."'
Id.; see also John McDermott, Trading with the Enemy: British Business and the Law During the
FirstWorld War, 32 CAN. J. HIST. 201 (1997); R.F. Roxburgh, The Alien Enemy in English Law, 2
J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 269, 275 (1920). Two Trading with the Enemy (Statutory List)
Proclamations dated February 29, 1916, and April 26, 1916, carried into force the Act of 1915,
and inaugurated the blacklisting system which was used until the end of the hostilities. See
J.E.G. De Montmorency, The Black List, 3 PROBS. OF THE WAR 29, 32 (1917).
27. See Trading with the Enemy, 3 MOD. L. REv. 219, 220 (1940) (noting, regarding the
English regulations of 1914 and 1915, that "[s]tep by step the scope of the . . . statutes of the last
war had to be enlarged so as to include an increasing number of persons and 'bodies of persons'
in order to give effect to the legal requirements of economic warfare.").
28. See Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. Law No. 65-91, § 5(b), 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 95a - 95b and 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 - 44).
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"only sleeping"29 during peace periods, ready to be re-employed either as a
foreign policy instrument or to face domestic emergencies.30 A good
example of the latter resides in the use made of the TWEA by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 in ordering a bank holiday or by President
Richard Nixon in 1970 in reacting to a postal strike.3'
In the immediate aftermath of the Watergate scandal in 1977, with the
intent of confining presidential powers, Congress enacted the International
Emergency Economic PowersAct (IEEPA), limiting the scope of the TWEA to
an "unusual and extraordinary threat" if the President declares that threat a
national emergency. 32 Nevertheless, since its adoption, the IEEPA has
constituted the legal basis for the enactment of a wide range of economic
sanctions, often put into place with the TWEA.33
These developments show that U.S. economic sanctions have from time
to time been conceived, throughout their history, as naturally extraterritorial
in their scope. In fact, traditionally:
29. Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Judicial Construction of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 721, 725 (1949), argued that "the question of the extent of the survival of the old Act has
not proved embarrassing [, as iut seems to have been assumed from the first . .. that the World
War I provisions (except such of them as in terms were applicable only to that war) had not been
dead but only sleeping, and that they automatically became effective upon the outbreak of
World War II."
30. "While most of the war-related statutes were terminated at the end of World War I, the
TWEA was retained, primarily because property was still held by the Alien Property Custodian
under authority of the Act. Although commentators have remarked that the TWEA was always
considered legislation available in the event of another war, the Act was next relied upon by
[subsequent] President[s] . . . [to address] a domestic, peacetime emergency." Mary M.
Coughlin Bowman, PresidentialEmergency Powers Related to International Economic Transactions:
CongressionalRecognition of Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 518 (1978).
31. See HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 156 - 57 (2005).
32. Cf International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95-223, Title II, § 202, 91
Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified in 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)) (establishing that "[a]ny authority granted to
the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President
declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."). Bowman, supra note 30, at 521,
pointed out in this regard that "[i]t was not until Congress became concerned over the
unilateral actions of the executive branch that there was any demonstrable interest in what it
recognized as a shift of power from Congress to the President, primarily in foreign policy and
the budget." See also The InternationalEmergency Economic PowersAct: A CongressionalAttempt to
Control Emergency Presidential Power, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1102, 1105 (1983). In this regard,
Detlev F. Vagts, Trends in InternationalBusiness Law: Towards a New Ethnocentricity, 1 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 11, 17 (1979), noticed that the provisions of the TWEA "were gradually
undermined by the desire of American business to retain business relationships, the public's
eagerness for a restoration of diplomatic relations, an administrative concern for the disapproval
expressed by U.S. allies, and a congressional urge to confine the executive's powers."
33. "Congress first in the TWEA and then in IEEPA, therefore, delegated a host of powers
that presidents can pursue in an emergency, and it can limit those authorities further if it should
so choose." Krent, supra note 31, at 157.
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An embargo applies only within the territory of the state and does not
interfere directly with transactions in other states or with acts done in
the territory, even, of the state against which it is directed .

. .

. Its

immediate effect is domestic, and it applies to persons and goods within
territory over which the jurisdiction of the state is undoubted.34
But embargo measures may also be used as extraterritorial sanctions, as they
produce effects beyond the borders of the United States.35 The expectation
is that these measures will be sufficient to produce a change of attitude from
the government towards which they are directed.36 As courts have affirmed
in relation to the TVEA and the various regulations derived therefrom,
"[their] goal is to prevent .

.

. [targeted countries and subjects] from deriving

any economic benefit from transactions with persons subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States . . . [as] money is an important weapon in
any international struggle . . . ."37
B.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

A series of criminal and administrative provisions ensure the enforcement
of U.S. economic sanctions at all times.
To begin with the criminal provisions, IEEPA's section 206 declares it
"unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or
cause a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued
under this [Act]."38 As for any other federal crime, it is for the DOJ to

prosecute such violations. Moreover, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a division of the Treasury Department constituted in
1950 and potentiated in the following decades,39 takes care of the enforce34. Joseph Chamberlain, Embargo as a Sanction of InternationalLaw, 27 Am. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 66, 67 (1933).
3 5. See id.
36. See id. at 67-68.
37. Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Reg'l Comm'r of Customs, Region II and
the Sec'y of Treas. of the United States, 459 F.2d 676, 680 (3d Cir. 1972).
38. 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) (2016).
39. OFAC's predecessor, the Division of Foreign Assets, was established in the Office of
International Finance under President Harry Truman in 1950, during the Korean War, to
address the blockade of Chinese and North Korean assets. See Treas. Dept. Order of Dec. 5,
1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 9040 (Dec. 5, 1950); see also Tracy J. Chin, An Unfree Trade in Ideas: How
OFAC's Regulations Restrain First Amendment Rights, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1883, 1887 (2008)
(describing OFAC's history). The origin of the Division dates back to 1940, when after
Germany's occupation of Denmark and Norway, the U.S. government decided to create the
Office of Foreign Funds Control to administer the frozen German assets, including those
related to countries that would have been subsequently occupied by the Third Reich. See id.; see
also MARTIN LORENZ-MEYER, SAFEHAVEN: THE ALLIED PURSUIT OF NAzi ASSETs ABROAD
20-21 (2007). In 1962, a few months after President John F. Kennedy proclaimed an embargo
against Cuba, see Proclamation 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962), the Secretary of the
Treasury delegated all its powers under section 5(b) of the TIWEA, which had been delegated to
him during the World War II, see Exec. Order No. 9193, 7 Fed. Reg. 5205 (July 6, 1942), to the
Division, which became the OFAC. See Treas. Dept. Order No. 128 (Rev. 1, Oct. 15, 1962)
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ment of the administrative provisions supporting U.S. economic sanctions. 40
In particular, the OFAC promulgates sanctions regulations and applies
sanctions as it administers the lists of Specially Designated Nationals
(SDNs), ensuring the tradition of blacklisting one's enemies in regard to
trade.4' These SDN lists include natural and legal persons depending on the
targets (terrorists, drug traffickers, etc.).42 XVhen a person's name appears as
an SDN in one of these lists, any transfer to such person, no matter where
located, is prohibited without the OFAC's authorization43
As mentioned, the OFAC operates both as a regulator and as an
enforcement agency.44 As a regulator, it determines the special legal regime
applicable to the different targeted countries and grants the exemptions to
such a regime.45 For example, special regimes are in place against Sudan,
Iran, and Cuba.46 In case of violation, OFAC carries out the necessary civil
investigations, possibly in coordination with other authorities at the federal
or state level, and often interacts with foreign regulators and enforcement
agencies.47
(amended by Office of Foreign Assets Control: Authority and Functions, 32 Fed. Reg. 3472
(March 2, 1967)). Currently, "OFAC administers section 5 of the [TWEA]," M. Cherif
Bassiouni & Eliot A. Landau, PresidentialDiscretion in Foreign Trade and Its Effects on East-West
Trade, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 494, 517 (1968), and "is delegated the administration of blocking
controls as well as other restrictions over property imposed under Section 5 (b) of the [TIWEA]
.... ." Arthur John Armstrong, A FederalMarshallingofAssets Statute: Equitable Compensationfor
InternationalClaimants, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 211, 232 (1972).
40. Actually, "[flor the past fifty years, OFAC has been the agency through which the U.S.
government has implemented its sanctions regime." Court E. Golumbic & Robert S. Ruff III,
Leveraging the Three Core Competencies: How OFAC Licensing Optimizes Holistic Sanctions, 38 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & Com. REG. 729, 733 (2013) (emphasis added). More than that, "OFAC is the
office responsible for issuing, interpreting, and applying the regulations that implement the
various trade embargoes imposed by the United States." MATIAS F. TRAVIESO-DIAZ, THE
LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET CUBA: A PROSPECTUS FOR BUSINEss 18 (1997).
41. See Golumbic & Ruff, supra note 40, at 771 - 72.
42. See Judith Lee & James Slear, Beware of OFAC: A Little-Known Agency Poses Challenges to
InternationalFinance, 25 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 58, 58 (2006). The list is currently composed of
about 20,000 entities. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SPECIALLY DESIGNATED NATIONALS AND BLOCKED PERSON LIST (2018), https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx (follow "Complete
Specially Designated Nationals List (in PDF format)" hyperlink).
43. See Lee & Slear, supra note 42, at 58.
44. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 40, at 18.
45. See Chin, supra note 39, at 1888. In fact, "[tihe primary mission of OFAC is to administer
and enforce economic sanctions against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists and
terrorist organizations, weapons of mass destruction proliferators, narcotic traffickers, and
others, in furtherance of U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives." Dep't
of Treas., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 74
Fed. Reg. 57593, 57594 (Nov. 9, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 501).
46. See Chin, supra note 39, at 1884.
47. See Dep't of Treas., Office of Foreign Assets Control, Economic Sanctions Enforcement
Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 57594.
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Despite its limited size-it currently employs no more than 150
employees-and its "relative obscurity,"48 the OFAC has demonstrated
extremely broad powers both in theory and in practice.49 Undoubtedly, it
can blacklist entities not directly related to U.S. security concerns, 0 and it
can freeze any subject's assets with no need for substantiated evidence.5'

C.

EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Since their first enactment, the U.S. economic sanctions have always
impacted the world of international business transactions. But in the last
decade they have received new, extraordinarily strong enforcement by the
U.S. government, including vis-i-vis foreign corporations.
Heightened enforcement began around 2001 with the Enron and the
Arthur Andersen scandal, when the American corporate community found
itself in the eye of a political and legal storm. 52 On the wave of reform that
ensued in 2003, the DOJ amended its corporate prosecution guidelines by
focusing on corporate culture and compliance rather than punishment.53
This new approach also demonstrated a greater ambition in terms of its
extraterritorial effects by targeting predominantly foreign corporations with
links to the U.S. Assistant Attorney General and head of the DOJ's Criminal
Division Alice S. Fisher effectively delineated this change of paradigm when,
a few years later, she announced the new DOJ policy: "to root out global
corruption and preserve the integrity of world's market."54 She said: "I want
48. Lee & Slear, supra note 42, at 58.
49. See id.
50. See Louisa C. Slocum, OFAC, the Department ofState, and the TerroristDesignationProcess:A
ComparativeAnalysis ofAgency Discretion, 65 ADMIN. L. REv. 387, 390 (2013) (stating that OFAC
"can designate entities that do not directly threaten the country's security.").
51. See Vanessa Ortblad, Criminal Prosecution in Sheep's Clothing: The Punitive Effects of OFAC
Freezing Sanctions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439, 1442 (2008) (noting that "[w]hat is
most troubling about OFAC's power is that it may freeze an entity's assets with extremely little
evidence.").
52. See, e.g., Timeline: A chronology of Enron Corp., N.Y. TIMES: INT'L Bus. (Jan. 18, 2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/18/business/worldbusiness/timeline-a-chronology-ofenron-corp.html.
53. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam
.pdf (amending and implementing the Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Eric H.
Holder, Jr. to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (June 16, 1999), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2010/04/1 1/charging-corps.PDF
(where the Holder Memorandum listed eight factors to lead prosecutors to indict or settle with
corporate actors: the nature of the offense; the pervasiveness of the wrongdoing within the
corporation; the defendant's history; the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure; the
existence of adequate corporate compliance program; the remedies and actions taken by the
corporation; the prosecution's collateral consequences; the adequacy of non-criminal remedies).
54. See, e.g., George K. Foster, Combating Bribery of Indigenous Leaders in InternationalBusiness,
54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 59, 113 n.263 (2015).
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to send a clear message today that if a foreign company trades on U.S.
exchanges and benefits from U.S. capital markets, it is subject to our laws."55
Statistics show that the "DOJ's voracious appetite for .

.

. violators," as

scholars defined it,56 significantly targeted non-American businesses. For
instance, in his seminal book Too Big to Jail, Professor Brandon L. Garrett
explains that "[t]hirteen percent of the 2,262 corporate prosecutions between
2001 and 2012 . . . were foreign corporations."57 He also found that:
[F]oreign firms received an average fine of $35 million and made an
average total payment of almost $66 million. The comparison with
domestic firms is stark, as they received an average fine of $4.7 million
and made an average total payment of $12 million.58
According to these findings-which however do not include the $8.9 billion
forfeited by BNP Paribas in 201459-foreign firms are fined seven times
more than domestic firms and pay nine times the amounts paid by the
latter.60 As a result, non-American firms find themselves in an odd position
compared to American firms.
Academics associate this American exceptionalism in corporate
prosecution to the extremely broad discretion that American prosecutors
enjoy in deciding whether to prosecute or not, as well as to the prosecutionfriendly character of the American criminal system. 61 While an analysis of
these elements would exceed the scope of this article, it is important to
remark here that potential defendants, instead of preparing their defenses
based on certain allegations, deliberately choose to cooperate with the
prosecutors in order to avoid the burden of a trial.62 As Professor Garrett's
points out in this respect, in such a context "cooperating with U.S.
prosecutors is imperative."63 This new cooperative model has played a
central role in the heightened enforcement of economic sanctions against
foreign corporations.
55. See David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 671, 697
(2009).
56. Rebekah J. Poston & Ritchie T. Thomas, InvestigatingFraud in Emerging and Developed
Markets, 3 J. PAYMENT Sys. L. 72, 74 (2007).
57. BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 219 (2014).
58. Id. at 220.
59. See infra discussion Part II.A.
60. Garrett, supra note 57, at 220.
61. See id. at 224 (noting "U.S. prosecutors are simply more powerful than most prosecutors
elsewhere in the world. They possess extraordinarily wide discretion, and the adversarial system
in the United States creates an unusually prosecution-friendly dynamic by placing great
discretion in the hands of prosecutors-which also gives corporations more to gain by
cooperating.").

62. See id. (noting "[w]hen foreign companies have tried to push back [against prosecutors],
the consequences have not been good for them.").

6 3. Id.
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THE COOPERATIVE MODEL

Cooperation became the first pillar of the DOJ's sanctions policy. As a
start, the above-mentioned 2003 amendments to the corporate prosecution
guidelines extended the prosecutors' power to reach an agreement with
potential or actual defendants in exchange for cooperation.64 Such an
agreement may consist of three different forms: (i) the traditional plea
agreement; (ii) the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), and (iii) the nonprosecution agreement (NPA).65 All three have recently arisen as ordinary
prosecutorial tools in the field of corporate crimes.66
These three forms of agreement bear a commonality-they result in a
settlement that allows the corporation to avoid the trial and the related
costs.

67

But they also show certain differences.

Pursuant to a DPA, the

prosecutors simply agree to postpone the criminal charges to a subsequent
moment, committing to waive them all if the defendant abides by certain
terms. 68 If the latter breaches these terms, the deferral is automatically
64. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_privwaiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam
.pdf (stating that "[iln some circumstances ... granting a corporation immunity or amnesty or
pretrial diversion may be considered in the course of the government's investigation. In such
circumstances, prosecutors should refer to the principles governing non-prosecution
agreements generally.").
65. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66. See Michel Yangming Xiao, Deferred/Non Prosecution Agreements: Effective Tools to Combat
Corporate Crime, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 233, 234 (2013) (explaining that "[allthough
DPAs and NPAs were initially created as alternative forms of punishment for juvenile and drug
offenders, they are being used increasingly in corporate crime proceedings."). The key to
understanding the history and the recent evolution of DPAs is probation. In the field of
juvenile offenders, "[i]nstead of placing young, non-violent offenders on the track of traditional
criminal conviction-and thus inflicting on them the stigma of a criminal convictionprosecutors would file charges with a court, but then agree to suspend the prosecution.
Essentially, the defendant would be placed on a term of probation. If the offender successfully
completed this term, then the prosecutor would dismiss the charges." Gordon Bourjaily, DPA
DOA: How and Why Congress Should Bar the Use of Deferred and Non-ProsecutionAgreements in
Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 543, 544 (2015). The same reasoning is
followed in corporate crime cases, as "[c]orporate deferral scenarios typically involve a
prosecutor filing a criminal charge against a company, but agreeing not to prosecute the claim
contingent upon the corporation complying with the terms of the deferral agreement for a
period of time." Irina Kotchach Bleustein, Lauren J. Kelleher, & Danielle Zeitz-Winston,
Corporate Crminal Liability, 52 Am. CRLIM. L. REV. 851, 865 (2015); see also Astrid MignonColombet, La Self-Defense des Entreprises, in ANTOINE GARAPON & PIERRE SERVANSCHREIBER, DEALS DE JUSTICE: LE MARCHE AMERICAIN DE L'OBEISSANCE MONDIALISSE 79,

86 - 94 (2013) (describing the three forms of criminal settlement agreements).
67. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements:
An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 Am.
CRIM. L. REV. 537, 544 (2015) (noting that "[1]ike the traditional plea agreement, NPAs and
DPAs are pre-trial settlement through which the government and the corporation together
avoid the costs of trial.").
68. See id. at 545.
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terminated.69 The NPA follows a similar logic, allowing the prosecutor to
agree upon certain conditions not to prosecute the defendant at all.70

Finally, another striking difference between these three models resides in the
involvement of federal courts. While both DPAs and plea agreements are
subject to judicial scrutiny, NPAs are not. 71 Because of such an absence, the
parties, i.e. the prosecutors and the defendants-to-be, remain in full control
of the process, free to interpret the law as they please and to reach the
solution that better fits their respective interests. "In such a justice system,"
a French author noted, "the finding of the wrongdoing is left to the
prosecutor's office and to negotiations with the firm."72
This cooperative model has led to changes in the way corporations
approach economic sanctions, adopting a predominantly strategic approach
rather than a limited legal one. Indeed, a firm's decision to comply with
them or to cooperate in a related criminal investigation has become an
integral part of its business strategy, pertaining essentially to the function of
risk-assessment.73 As French scholar and corporate lawyer Hubert de
Vauplane notices in this regard:
Once a firm resolves to make [the U.S.] regulations its own, it has to put
into place certain procedures that allow it to ensure preemptively its
respect. . . . To decide not to align with [those regulations] risks
69. See Court E. Golumbic & Albert D. Lichy, The "Too Big to Jail" Effect and the Impact on the
L. J. 1293, 1299 -1300 (2014) ("[in
exchange for the prosecutor's stipulation to 'defer' criminal charges, the defendant agrees to
waive indictment and be charged criminally, and to fulfill certain requirements over a specified
period of time. If the defendant discharges her obligations, the charges against her are
If the
dismissed and she is treated as if the government declined to prosecute at the outset ....
defendant fails to abide by the terms of the deferred prosecution, however, she faces the specter
of criminal prosecution just the same as if the government had never granted a deferral.").
70. Actually, "[tihe difference between DPAs and NPAs is whether charges were ever filed."
Xiao, supra note 66, at 234 n.6; see also Bleustein, Kelleher, & Zeitz-Winston, supra note 66, at
866 (concluding that "NPAs work in much the same way [as DPAs], except there are no
publicly-filed charges and no court supervision of compliance with an agreement."). Obviously,
in the case of NPAs, charges might be filed later in the event that the defendant has breached
the obligations she had entered into in the NPA. See id.
71. See Alexander & Cohen, supra note 67, at 545 (pointing out that "there is indeed no direct
role for the federal courts to play in the approval or enforcement of an NPA, although there is
an open question as to whether a court could consider the breach of an NPA once the DOJ
brings actual charges.").
72. Astrid Mignon-Colombet, La Self-Defense des Entreprises, in ANTOINE GARAPON & PIERRE

Justice Department's Corporate ChargingPoliy, 65 HASTINGs

SERVAN-SCHREIBER,

DEALS

DE

JUSTICE:

LE

MARCHE

AMERICAIN

DE

L'OBEISSANCE

86 - 94 (2013).
73. Gregory Husisian, U.S. Regulation of International Financial Institutions: It's Time for an
IntegratedApproach to Compliance, 127 BANKING L. J. 195, 200 (2010) (noting that "[tihe risks for
[all] financial institutions flow both from their increased regulatory responsibilities and from the
inherent riskiness of these activities."). Peter Kurer notes that the rise of compliance officers in
global banks stems partly from the need to ensure compliance with U.S. regulations from the
perspective of risk management. PETER KURER, LEGAL AND COMPLIANCE RISK: A STRATEGIC
RESPONSE TO A RISING THREAT FOR GLOBAL BUSINEsS 74 - 77, 187 - 88 (2015).
MONDIALISSE 79,
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generating a gap with competitors and creating also difficulties with the
investors and with American clients which could eventually claim such a
respect. But the most important risk consists in being required, 'one
day', to explain to the authorities of the United States the reasons that
led the firm to disregard such regulations, while the firm entertains
more or less tight connections with the American market.

. .

. On the

opposite side, aligning with those regulations fills the gap and engages
the firm with obligations that require the mobilization of significant
resources that might often be over-proportionate compared to the
activities developed on the American soil. That is why this decision is
an eminently strategic one. 74

74. Hubert de Vauplane, Une Nouvelle G6opolitique de la Norme, in

ANTOINE

GARAPON

&

In this context, foreign corporations may obtain several benefits by
cooperating with the U.S. government in a criminal investigation. First,
these corporations would likely wish to avoid the risk of being dragged into
long-lasting-and sometimes combined?'-criminal, civil, and fiscal
proceedings in the United States.76 Also, any negotiations with the U.S.
government, even at a preliminary stage, must necessarily be kept secret,
doomed to be disclosed only at their final output with the signature of the
final settlement.77 Otherwise, a reputational harm may increasingly
supplement the entire phase of negotiations up to draining off the company's
entire shareholder value.78 Obviously, cooperation and confidentiality go
along, and as far as the defendant-to-be is willing to cooperate, the criminal
investigation remains secret. 79
On the other hand, uncooperative corporations might be subject to
retaliation by the U.S. government in the form of revocation or suspension

PIERRE SERVAN-SCHREIBER, DEALS DE JUSTICE: LE MARCHE AMERICAIN DE L'OBEISSANCE

MONDIALISSE 23, 33 - 34 (2013).
75. Actually, pre-trial negotiations with the DOJ may involve various governmental
agencies-including, of course, OFAC-with which the DOJ may be expected to work "in
conjunction" and simultaneously. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry
Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2003jan20_priv

waiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf (under which "the [DOJ], in conjunction with regulatory
agencies and other executive branch departments, encourages corporations, as part of their

compliance programs, to conduct internal investigations and to disclose their findings to the
appropriate authorities. Some agencies ... have formal voluntary disclosure programs in which
self-reporting, coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may qualify the corporation for
amnesty or reduced sanctions.").
76. Lack of cooperation with U.S. authorities exposes firms "to the triple risk of a criminal
proceeding, a civil action and a tax adjustment." OLIVIER BAsso, POLITIQUE DE LA TRPS
GRANDE ENTREPRISE. LEADERSHIP ET DSMOCRATIE PLANSTAIRE 243

(2015).

77. See Olivier Boulon, Une Justice Ngocide, in Antoine Garapon & Pierre Servan-Schreiber,
Deals de Justice: Le Marche Am6ricain de l'Obeissance Mondialis6e 41, 69 (2013).
78. See id. at 69 (noting that "[clooperating with U.S. authorities in the framework of an
informal procedure allows firms to economize on the negative publicity that would result from a
public disclosure concerning the opening of a judicial procedure against the firm.").

79. See id.
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of their license to do business in the United States and a ban to do business
with U.S. public entities.8o All these risks, if concretized, may be deeply
harmful, especially for foreign banks and financial institutions. Therefore,
while according to some scholars "it is merely unconceivable for an
international bank not to access the American market,"si thus implying that
such a bank has no choice but to cooperate, the cooperative model remains
strategic in the sense that the amount paid by foreign corporations to the
U.S. government represents "the price to retain the access to the American
market open,"82 making the decision to cooperate simply more efficient than

pursuing the matter in a court of law.
A last key feature is voluntary self-disclosure.83 From the corporation's
perspective, voluntary self-disclosure is a potential ground for clemency. But
from the government's standpoint it becomes a proper obligation. In this
regard, OFAC regulations and DOJ guidelines adopt the same policy, both
putting the degree of contribution to the violation on stage.84
Under OFAC regulations, voluntary self-disclosure is a factor that
determines the egregiousness of a violation and, as a consequence, the
penalty to be applied in a concrete instance.85 Specifically, if the violation
comes to OFAC's attention by means other than voluntary self-disclosure,
the starting penalty is the maximum for that violation.86 Moreover, the

&

80. Firms decide to cooperate because "if they refuse, they expose themselves to the sovereign
decision of the U.S. authorities to withdraw their licence [sic] of exploitation on American
territory." Basso, supra note 76, at 243. U.S. laws which apply to foreign entities generally
provide for the possibility of the government to revoke their license, nullify their charter or halt
their activities if they go against the law. For instance, OFAC regulations establish that foreign
financial institutions who engage in a prohibited activity may face restrictions regarding "the
opening or maintaining of a correspondent account or a payable-through account in the United
States. . . ." CISADA-Based Sanctions on Certain Foreign Financial Institutions, 31 C.F.R.
§ 561.201 (2016).
81. Boulon, supra note 77, at 70.
82. De Vauplane, supra note 74, at 33-34 (transl. from French).
83. See generally Richard L. Matheny, So Many Featherson the Scale: Whether and How Voluntary
Disclose Violations of U.S. Exports Controls and Economic Sanctions Laws, 6 GLOBAL TRADE
CUST. J. 389 (2011).
84. Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 890 (2012) (noting that
both the DOJ and OFAC "place culpability at the center of the penalty process"). See also
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1130 (2006) (noting that
OFAC's amended regulations "focus on factors similar to those in the Thompson Memo").
85. According to the OFAC regulations, voluntary self-disclosure means "self-initiated
notification to OFAC of an apparent violation by a [subject] that has committed, or otherwise
participated in, an apparent violation of a statute, Executive order, or regulation administered or
enforced by OFAC, prior to or at the same time that OFAC, or any other federal, state, or local
government agency or official, discovers the apparent violation or another substantially similar
apparent violation." 31 C.F.R. Pt. 501, App. A, § 1(1) (2012).
86. In particular, "if the apparent violation comes to OFAC's attention by means other than a
voluntary self-disclosure, the base amount of the proposed civil penalty in the Pre-Penalty
Notice shall be the applicable statutory maximum penalty amount applicable to the violation."
31 C.F.R. Pt. 501, App. A § V(B)(2)(a)(iv) (2012).
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aforementioned 2003 amendments to the corporate prosecution guidelines
mandate federal prosecutors to consider a number of factors. These include:
the existence of a formal and reliable compliance program, timely and
voluntary disclosure, and the management's involvement in said compliance
program.87 The completeness of the disclosure (including internal
investigations) is also considered in this respect.88
All these factors pertain to the way U.S. law enforcement agencies bring
an investigation against foreign corporations for the violation of economic
sanctions, and to the way the latter react. These developments are shaping
the mechanisms through which the U.S. authorities now attempt to prevent
these violations from even happening. The key lies in the compliance
function of foreign corporations. While the practice of U.S. corporate
prosecutions shows that all the foreign banks targeted in the last decade had
a compliance office (some of whom even boasted about its efficiency,
preparation and capacity of reaction), those offices were ill-equipped to
respond to the allegations presented by the U.S. government. To this "dark
side of compliance" of foreign banks we dedicate the following Part.
II.

The Dark Side of Compliance

The purpose of this Part is to illustrate how the compliance offices of nonU.S. banks failed to abide by the legal arsenal described in Part I and to what
extent they were affected by its enforcement. As of today, at least nine major
global non-U.S. banks have paid substantial amounts to the U.S.
government as a result of violating economic sanctions arsenal (in
descending order based on the amount paid, in U.S. dollars, with the
mention of the home country): (i) BNP Paribas S.A. (8.9 billion; France);89
87. In this respect, the Thompson Memorandum requires prosecutors to consider, as a ground
for leniency and "[e]ven in the absence of a formal program, [ . ] a corporation's timely and
voluntary disclosure in evaluating the adequacy of the corporation's compliance program and its
management's commitment to the compliance program." See Memorandum from Deputy
Attorney Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components and U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20,
2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiv

er/2003jan20_privwaiv-dojthomp.authcheckdam.pdf.
88. Id. ("[o]ne factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary, a waiver of the
attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors and employees and counsel.
Such waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and
targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements. In

addition, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate the completeness of a
corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation. Prosecutors may, therefore, request a
waiver in appropriate circumstances. The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a
corporation's attorney-client and work product protection an absolute requirement, and
prosecutors should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive such protection when
necessary to provide timely and complete information as one factor in evaluating the
corporation's cooperation").
89. Cf infra the text corresponding to notes 112-135.
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(ii) HSBC Bank N.V. (1.921 billion; the Netherlands);90 (iii) ING Bank,
N.V. (619 million; the Netherlands);91 (iv) Standard Chartered (667 million;
U.K.);92 (v) Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ (565 million; Japan);93 (vii) ABN AMRO
90. Cf infra the text corresponding to notes 147-166.
91. Cf infra the text corresponding to note 146.
92. Accusations against Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) were based on the allegation that
"[f]or almost ten years, SCB schemed with the Government of Iran and hid from regulators
roughly 60,000 secret transactions, involving at least $250 billion, and reaping SCB hundreds of
millions of dollars in fees . . . [, leaving] the U.S. financial system vulnerable to terrorists,
weapons dealers, drug kingpins and corrupt regimes, and deprived law enforcement
investigators of crucial information used to track all manner of criminal activity." Standard
Chartered Bank, New York Branch, 2012 WL 3594813 at *1 (N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Aug. 6,
2012) (Order pursuant to Banking Law § 39). Subsequently, the bank entered into a consent
order with the NYSDFS and two deferred prosecution agreements with the DOJ and the
District Attorney of the County of New York, and finally settled with the OFAC, but was
pushed to make another settlement in 2014 after the monitor appointed pursuant to the
previous DPA brought to the attention of the NYSDFS some deficiencies in SCB's anti-money
laundering system. See, respectively, Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch, 2012 'WL
5194361 at *1 - 2 (N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Sep. 21, 2012) (Consent Order under New York
Banking Law § 44); United States v. Standard Chartered Bank, No. 1:12-CR-00262, 2012 WL
609733 5 (D.D.C., Dec. 7, 2012) (SCB DPA); Press Release, Dep't of Just., Standard Chartered
Bank Agrees to Forfeit $227 Million for Illegal Transactions with Iran, Sudan, Libya, and
Burma (Dec. 10, 2012) (noting that Standard Chartered entered into " a deferred prosecution
agreement with the New York County District Attorney's Office for violating New York state
laws by illegally moving millions of dollars through the U.S. financial system."), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/standard-chartered-bank-agrees-forfeit-227-million-illegaltransactions-iran-sudan-libya-and; Standard Chartered Bank, MUL-607200 (Dep't of the
Treas., Off. of Foreign Assets Control) (SCB Settlement Agreement) (Dec. 10, 2012), available
at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121210_SCBSet
tlement.pdf; more recently, Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch, 2014 WL 4699596
(N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., Aug. 19, 2014) (Consent Order under New York Banking Law §§ 39
and 44).
93. The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., was reported to have paid two major sums to
the New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), respectively of 250 million and
315 million dollars, both relating to dollar-clearing transactions performed mainly through its
New York branch and other New York-based financial institutions on behalf of Iran, Sudan and
Myanmar entities. In particular, in 2013 the bank entered into a 250 million dollar consent
order with the NYDFS concerning "approximately 28,000 U.S. dollar payments through New
York worth close to $110 billion involving Iran, and additional payments involving Sudan and
Myanmar, and certain entities on the Specially Designated Nationals list issued by the U.S.
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Asset Control." Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi-UFJ, Ltd.,
New York Branch, at 2 (N.Y. St. Dep't Fin. Servs., June 19, 2013) (Consent Order under New
York Banking Law § 44). Later on, however, the investigators discovered that the bank had
instructed the consulting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) "to remove excerpts from drafts
[... ] that would have cast doubt upon the thoroughness, objectivity and reliability of the finding
contained in the [rieport submitted to Regulators on behalf of the Bank." Bank of Tokyo
Mitsubishi-UFJ, Ltd., New York Branch, 2014 WL 6611758 at *2 (N.Y. St. Dep't Fin. Servs.,
Nov. 18, 2014) (Consent Order under New York Banking Law § 39 and 44). This obliged the
bank to sign, in 2014, a second settlement agreement with the NYDFS for the amount of 315
million dollars. Id., at *5. See Richard L. Cassin, Run-Amok Compliance Officers Cost Bank of
Tokyo Mitsubishi $ 315 Millionfor Sanctions Report Whitewash, THE FCPA BLOG (Nov. 18, 2014),
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Bank N.V. (580 million; the Netherlands);94 (Vii) Cr6dit Suisse AG (536
million; Switzerland);95 (viii) Lloyds TSB Bank PLC (350 million; U.K.);96
and (ix) Barclays Bank PLC (298 million; U.K.).97 The only cases that will
be analyzed are those that are interesting both in terms of amount paid and
relevance of the measures taken according to the agreements entered into
with the U.S. government-mainly the first three (BNP Paribas, Lloyds,
HSBC, and ING).
This Part starts with a short summary of the ways compliance offices work
generally in global firms and an account of how banks that were
subsequently caught in non-compliance by the U.S. government used to
praise the large reaction capabilities of their own legal and compliance
offices (section A). Following negotiations with the U.S. government, the
very same banks had to publicly disclose their failures. Specific sections
focus on the case of the group led by the French bank BNP Paribas S.A.
(section B) and other banks like HSBC and ING (section C).
A.

How COMPLIANCE WORKS (AND FAILS)

Every respected global firm has a compliance office, which functions to
monitor the firm's activities and report suspected wrongdoing to the board
of directors.98 To perform these tasks fully and punctually, the compliance
office should be independent and provided with sufficient funds and
resources.
The law determines to a certain degree the extent of the severance of the
compliance function from the main decisional bodies of a company.
Generally speaking, one can say that global firms "establish an official
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/11/18/run-amok-compliance-officers-cost-bank-of-tokyomitsubishi-3.html?printerFriendly=true.
94. Cf infra the text corresponding to notes 138-140.
95. The sanctions paid by Credit Suisse AG in 2009 related to multiple and systematic
violations of economic sanctions in force against Iran, Libya, Burma, Sudan, and Cuba as well as
OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals. Jason A. Burner, The Tour de Fraud: What Foreign
Banks Can Learn from the BNP ParibasSettlement, 19 N.C. BANKING INST. 196 - 198 (2015). See
United States v. Credit Suisse AG, No. CR-09-352, 2009 WL 4894467 (D.D.C., Dec. 16, 2009).
96. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC signed two deferred prosecution agreements with the DOJ and the
District Attorney of the County of New York at the beginning of 2009 to avoid prosecution for
violations of economic sanctions against Iran. See United States v. Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, No.
CR-09-007 (D.D.C., Jan. 9, 2009) [hereinafter Lloyds DPA]; Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, MUL4745344 (Dep't of the Treas., Off. of Foreign Assets Control) (Lloyds Settlement Agreement)
(Dec. 22, 2009), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFACEnforcement/Documents/lloydsagreement.pdf. See also Lee, Part I, supra note 1, at 669 - 674.
97. See Lee, Part I, supra note 1, at 681-684.
98. "The compliance function aims at identifying, evaluating, and controlling the risk of noncompliance of the company, in particular of the risk of judicial (specifically criminal),
administrative or disciplinary sanction, financial loss, or infringement of the reputation, which
arises out of non-compliance with specific provisions regulating the banking or financial
activities, being them of legislative or regulatory nature, or professional or deontological norms,
or enacted by the Executive." EMMANUEL DAOUD & JULIE FERRARI, GERER LE RISQUE PSNAL
EN ENTREPRISE 121 (2011) (transl. from French).
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'compliance program' [. . .] and/or designate a specific individual, such as the
chief compliance officer (CCO), with overall responsibility for compliance,
who reports to the board of directors."99 But specific regulations may dictate
more specific requirements. For instance, certain OFAC regulations oblige
banks to implement internal procedures in order to identify suspicious
accounts and transactions.oo This control also involves the designation of a
compliance officer who is responsible for the OFAC compliance program.' 0
No global firm would publicly deny or belittle the importance of an
effective and efficient compliance office. And yet, statements made to that
end-no matter how pompous-cannot contradict the fact that, more often
than one may think, compliance offices are understaffed and their
complaints to the board remain most times unheard. The French Bank
BNP Paribas S.A. (BNPP) exemplified this fact before it was so publicly
brought under rebuke in 2014.
In fact, in its Report on Environmental and Social Responsibility for 2007,
BNPP praised its compliance office as a "key element" of its internal control
system.1 02 According to BNPP, its compliance policy "meets the criteria of
exhaustiveness and universality and the same highest standards are applied
[. . .] in France and abroad [pursuant to] the most stringent of the
regulations laid down by the laws of the various countries in which the
[BNPP] Group has operations

. . .]."103

From the operational standpoint, a set of local teams representing ninetyfive percent of the function's staff had to coordinate with a centralized office
headed by a member of the executive committee under the direct supervision
of the CEO.104 Under this scheme, all employees, and especially those
facing clients directly, acted as gatekeepers in detecting potential
violations.105 An escalation alerting procedure was in place consisting of
both a permanent control system and periodic inspections.106 While the

operational staff was accountable for the risks generated by their own
activities, "independent control functions-risk and compliance-[had the]
primary responsibility [] to oversee the way in which risks are taken and
managed by operational staff, particularly by taking a second look at certain
99. Agnes Bundy Scanlan & Catherine Purdon, Compliance ProgramManagementfor Financial
Services Institutions in Today's Environment, 62 Bus. LAw. 735, 735 (2006).
100. David Zaring, Sending the Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOwA L. REv. 1359, 1406 (2007),
referring to 31 C.F.R. § 103.140 (2006).
101. Id.
102. BNP PARIBAS, REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 82 (2007),

stating that the "[clompliance function is one of the key
mechanism."
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
106. The escalation procedure is triggered by an employee
transaction that he/she thinks to be non-compliant. Then,
teams and officers, the information climbs the company's
officers and the board of directors.

elements of its internal control

informing his/her superiors of a
through appropriate compliance
hierarchical structure to the top
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decisions [. . .]."07 Adequate employee training was essential as well.
According to the above-mentioned 2007 Report, BNPP provided
compliance training to 82,000 employees, with an increase of thirty percent
compared to 2006,10 which it intensified throughout the decade.109
Additionally, BNPP compliance policy expressly mandated financial
security teams to take control over transactions affected by embargo
measures in general. BNPP ensures that this control as well had been
strengthened over time through appropriate instructions and "imperative
guidelines."nio
Despite this seemingly reassuring scheme, "[t]he American guillotine has
fallen" on BNPP.111 A lengthy investigation brought by the DOJ and other
U.S. governmental agencies led to the discovery of a massive number of
violations of the economic sanctions enacted against Sudan, Iran, and
Cuba.112 Together with its Swiss subsidiary in Geneva, [BNPP].
conspired with banks and other entities located in or controlled by
countries subject to U.S. sanctions, including Sudan, Iran and Cuba
('Sanctioned Entities'), other financial institutions located in countries
not subject to U.S. sanctions, and others known and unknown, to
107. Jaeger, supra note 7, at 22.
108. Report on Environmental and Social Responsibility 2007, supra note 102, at 84.
109. BNP PARIBAS, 2012 CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT (2012), at 37 (noting
that "[b]etween September 2011 and August 2012, [BNPP's] employees attended more than
138,000 training events on [, among other things,] financial embargoes . . . ").
110. Report on Environmental and Social Responsibility 2007, supra note 102, at 84 (stating
that "[i]nstructions relating to the application of these embargoes lay down imperative
guidelines for detecting and dealing with transactions by clients targeted by these measures, in
accordance with the legislation in force. In light of the particularly sensitive political and
regulatory climate in 2007, the mechanism for ensuring compliance with financial embargoes
has been strengthened.").
111. Capital Punishment: France'sLargest Bank Gets Findedfor Evading American Sanctions, THE
ECONOMIST,

July 5, 2014.

-

112. United States v. BNP Paribas S.A., No. 14 Cr. 460, 2015 WL 1962882 (S.D.N.Y., May 6,
2015). See Press Release, Dep't of Just., BNP Paribas Sentenced for Conspiring to Violate the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act (May 1,
2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bnp-paribas-sentenced-conspiring-violateinternational-emergency-economic-powers-act-and. The text of the plea agreement between
BNP Paribas S.A. (BNPP) and the DOJ is reported under the Government's Memorandum in
Support of the Court's Acceptance of the Plea Agreement, United States v. BNP ParibasS.A.,
No. 14 Cr. 460, 2014 WL 8815128 (S.D.N.Y., July 17, 2014). The plea agreement itself
presents the Statement of Facts as Exhibit B (Statement of Facts). See United States v. BNP
Paribas S.A., Dep't of Just., U.S. Att'y, S.D.N.Y (June 27, 2014) (Plea Agreement). All
documents regarding the case, in particular the Information, the Plea Agreement, the Notice of
Intent, the Statement of Facts and the Consent Preliminary Order of Forfeiture are available at
the website http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/supporting-documents-us-v-bnp-paribas
(retrieved July 12, 2017). For a commentary of the case see Lee, Part II, supra note 1, at 748
762; Louis d'Avout, Droit du commerce international, 34 RECUEIL DALLOZ, 1967, 1967 - 1969
(Oct. 9, 2014); Burner, The Tour de Fraud, supra note 95, at 191; Kristina Daugirdas & Julian
Davis Mortenson, French Bank Pleads Guilty in Criminal Violations of U.S. Sanctions Law, 108 Am.
J. INT'L L. 826 (2014).
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knowingly, intentionally and willfully move at least $8,833,600,000
through the U.S. financial system on behalf of Sanctioned Entities in
violation of U.S. sanctions laws .... .113
According to the DOJ, not only had BNPP deliberately disregarded the law
by providing targeted countries with access to the U.S. financial system,114
but it had also tried to conceal these violations, attempting to evade the
detection of its acts by the U.S. government." 5 But how was this possible,
with such an apparently well-structured and well-informed compliance
office?
B.

A

FAILURE IN COMPLIANCE: THE EXAMPLE OF

BNP

PARIBAS

Cases such as BNPP bring forth key issues about the participation of the
Chief Compliance Officer (CCO) and Chief Legal Officer (CLO) of foreign
corporations in spotting and addressing OFAC compliance issues. In some
cases, both figures were aware of the bank's illegal practices, but possessed
no tools to effectuate a real change in the corporate conduct.i6 In others,
they sided with the business managers, who, in at least one instance,
encouraged the legal office to continue the illegal practice.117 The former
cases delineate issues of effectiveness and credibility of the compliance office
internally; the latter question the actual independence of the office from the
firm's managers. BNPP lacked both.
To begin with, one should underline that thousands of international
business transactions with entities targeted with economic sanctions were
deliberately performed, notwithstanding the knowledge of their illegality
under U.S. laws and regulations and despite repeated government's
113. United States v. BNP Paribas S.A., Statement of Facts, supra note 112, ¶ 14.
114. According to Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell, by committing these
violations "BNPP deliberately disregarded the law and provided rogue nations, and Sudan in
particular, with vital access to the global financial system .....
Press Release, BNP Paribas
Sentenced for Conspiring, supra note 112.
115. Id. ("BNPP provided access to billions of dollars to these sanctioned countries, and did so
deliberately and secretly, in a way designed to evade detection by the U.S. authorities.").
116. In fact, "these personnel identified and warned about practices, but were not able on their
own to effect changes in the practices." Lee, Part I, supra note 1, at 686, adding that "[t]his
scenario presents a dilemma for a banking institution. The dilemma, indeed paradox, is that a
strong compliance program can be self-defeating if it effectively monitors behavior and
identifies problems, but its findings and warnings are then disregarded by the business units.
Such a fact pattern supplies the prosecutors with indelible evidence that the institution in
continuing the practices or activities was acting with the requisite knowledge and intent to
support criminal prosecution. This dilemma can be addressed (though never wholly solved) by
creating a culture and governance structure that empowers the compliance function itself to
address the practices or requires the compliance function to escalate the issues to a more senior
level for prompt resolution."
117. "[T]he business managers engaged in illegal conduct with the knowledge of the
compliance and legal staff and, in the case of at least one institution, with their encouragement."
Id. (concluding that "[t]hese constitute stark judgments about the compliance culture of the
institutions involved.").
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warnings. Thus, these transactions did not simply escape in-house control,
but have been carefully executed with the knowledge of their illegality.
In BNPP, for example, the company not only covered the involvement of
SDNs, but also removed the related information from payment messages
and embroiled transactions with no other apparent business purpose than
concealing the entities' names and nationality.iis Concealment endured for
the entire period investigated by the DOJ, i.e. from 2004 to 2012, during
which BNPP used all its efforts to deceive the filters installed to identify and
block suspect transactions involving SDNs.119 When these filters identified
potentially suspect transactions, BNPP agreed with its clients in sanctioned
countries to avoid indicating the latter's names in the transactions processed
in the U.S.120 Another method consisted of exploiting unaffiliated banks,
which were internally referred to as "satellite banks," to disguise the true
origins of the transactions.121 These satellite banks operated for no other
business purpose than assisting BNPP in evading U.S. economic
sanctions.122
On multiple occasions, various U.S. governmental agencies warned BNPP
of the existence of these violations, but nevertheless the bank omitted to
promptly react and desist. For example, as a result of a first warning issued
in 2004, BNPP requested and obtained from its outside counsel in New York
a memorandum suggesting a shift in clearance operations from a non-U.S.
118. The means and methods of the BNPP's conspiracy in violating U.S. laws are described in
BNPP's Statement of Facts:
(a) BNPP intentionally used a non-transparent method of payment messages,
known as cover payments, to conceal the involvement of Sanctioned Entities in U.S.
dollar transactions processed through BNPP New York and other financial
institutions in the United States.
(b) BNPP worked with other financial institutions to structure payments in highly
complicated ways, with no legitimate business purpose, to conceal the involvement
of Sanctioned Entities in order to prevent illicit transactions from being blocked
when transmitted through the United States.
(c) BNPP instructed the co-conspirator financial institutions not to mention the
names of Sanctioned Entities in U.S. dollar payment messages sent to BNPP New
York and other financial institutions in the United States.
(d) BNPP followed instructions from co-conspirator Sanctioned Entities not to
mention their names in U.S. dollar payment messages sent to BNPP New York and
other financial institutions in the United States.
(e) BNPP removed information identifying Sanctioned Entities from U.S. dollar
payment messages in order to conceal the involvement of Sanctioned Entities from
BNPP New York and other financial institutions in the United States.
Statement of Facts, supra note 112, T 16. See also Lee, Part II, supra note 1, 750-751.
119. Statement of Facts, supra note 112, T 21.
120. Id. T 22.
121. Id. T 23.
122. Id. ¶ 24.
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BNPP executives
resolved accordingly.124
It did not take long for BNPP compliance and legal officers to realize that
this shift was insufficient to make those transactions legal. But they
continued allowing the transactions to take place,125 and when they discussed
the matter with the bank's executives, the latter dismissed the case and acted
as if the discussion had never taken place.126 The goal was, evidently, to
preserve the longstanding relationship with clients in sanctioned countries,
especially in Sudan.127 At the time, the letters of credit issued by BNPP
represented approximately one quarter of the country's exports and one fifth
of its imports.128 Although outside counsel warned that omitting relevant
information from payment messages could entail the banks' criminal
liability, illegal transactions continued, with BNPP processing $6.4 billion
with Sudan in 2007 alone.129 Reiteration of the criminal conduct
notwithstanding the warnings and the pending investigations also occurred
in respect of Iran3o and Cuba.'3' BNPP then continued with cover transfers
for long after its own compliance officers had denounced their illegality.132
In addition, compliance officers suggested that-to circumvent the risk of
economic sanctions enforcement-customers switch to another currency,
bank to a U.S. bank as a way to avoid sanctions.123

123. Id. 91 28 - 34. Outside counsel suggested that "[i]f a non-U.S. BNPP entity were to
initiate a U.S. dollar payment to a payee domiciled in Cuba, Sudan or Iran through a U.S. bank
not affiliated with BNPP, U.S. sanctions should not apply to BNPP (assuming no involvement
by any U.S. person of BNPP), but U.S. sanctions would call for the payment to be frozen or
blocked by the U.S. bank." Id. 9 34. The Statement of Facts does not reveal the name of the
law firm acting as outside counsel. Id. 9 30.
124. Statement of Facts, supra note 112, 9 30. In particular, "[iln implementing the switch
[. . .], BNPP relied on incorrect advice that outside counsel ("U.S. Law Firm 1") provided,
which suggested that BNPP may have been able to protect itself from being penalized by U.S.
authorities if it conducted these prohibited transactions through another U.S. bank. This was
memorialized in a legal memorandum in October 2004." Id.
125. Id. T 31. See also Lee, Part II, supra note 112, 753, noting that "[o]n several occasions
senior compliance and legal personnel at BNPP Geneva raised concerns about BNPP's business
with Sudanese entities, but they were generally rebuffed with the indication that the Sudanese
transactions had the 'full support' of management at BNPP Paris."
126. Statement of Facts, supra note 112, T 33.
127. See id. T 37, remarking that "BNPP continued to process transactions involving Sudanese
Sanctioned Entities-despite being well aware that its conduct violated U.S. law-because the
business was profitable and because BNPP Geneva did not want to risk its longstanding
relationship with Sudanese clients."
128. Id. 9 19.
129. See Statement of Facts, supra note 112, 91 35-41. Outside counsel advised BNPP that
"U.S. sanctions could apply to BNPP even when the transactions are processed by [a U.S. bank]
instead of BNPP New York." Id. 9 35.
130. Id. 91 45-46. In fact, "despite beginning its internal investigation in early 2010 at the
request of U.S. law enforcement authorities, BNPP failed to provide the U.S. authorities with
meaningful materials from BNPP Geneva until May 2013 and those materials were heavily
redacted due to bank secrecy laws in Switzerland." Lee, Part II, supra note 1, at 757.
131. Statement of Facts, supra note 112, 9 49.
132. Id. 91 51, 56.
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mainly euros. This attempt, however, failed miserably as clients obviously
resisted the change, so that ultimately most credit facilities continued to be
processed in U.S. dollars.33 Besides that, on occasion BNPP compliance
officers in Paris had wondered if BNPP's practice was in line with U.S. laws
and regulations; while some suspected it was not, others expressly
recognized it was not.1 34
BNPP's liability was aggravated by the fact that, at the time of its
violations, precedent existed that made all the practices put in place by
BNPP suspicious. The next paragraph discusses these precedents.
C.

NOTHING DIFFERENT: THE PRACTICE OF OTHER FOREIGN
BANKS

The inaccuracy in reporting suspicious activities, the incompleteness of
the information relating to wire transfers, and the under-implementation of
monitoring programs have been of interest to the U.S. government for a
long time, even before September 11, 2001. But afterwards, such efforts
intensified.131

In early 2005, for example, Banco de Chile agreed with the Department of
Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board to no longer allow unreferenced
payment messages, and to precisely identify the sender or the beneficiary of
a wire transfer.136

This enforcement action by the Department of the

Treasury resulted in an order for Banco de Chile to pay $3 million in a civil
133. Id. T 69 ("[d]espite the pressure from compliance personnel to convert the remaining
Cuban Credit Facility into euros, BNP continued to receive U.S. dollar payments related to the
facility until early 2010.").
134. Id. T 63. Moreover, a 2004 opinion issued by an American law firm advised that "any
BNPP transaction with a Cuban counterparty cleared in the United States by any bank [... .]
would fall within the scope of the Cuba sanctions." Id. T 60. As before, the firm suggested to
switch to a U.S. non-affiliated bank (an advice that, as it was lately discovered, was illgrounded), but the advice went unheard as BNPP at the time processed almost 96% of its
transactions via the BNPP office in New York. A second legal opinion was issued by the same
law firm two years later that predicted "the risk of serious regulatory sanction[s]. . . ." Id. T 57.
And yet, instead of instructing the compliance offices accordingly, once again BNPP did exactly
the opposite: a senior officer at BNPP Paris ordered the deletion of the e-mail containing the
legal opinion and summoned his colleagues and staff to disregard it as "it was a draft memo and
should not have been distributed to just anyone." Id.
135. See The USA Patriot Act and Due Diligence Requirements for Foreign Correspondence and
Private Banking Accounts: Part II, 2 J. PAYMENT Sys. 187 (2006).
136. Banco de Chile, New York Branch, No. 2005-2, AA-EC-05-09, 2005 WL 3967697 (Dep't
of the Treas., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Feb. 1, 2005) (Consent Order) (the bank
committing to "a prohibition against accepting or remitting any wire which does not identify
the sender or the beneficiary [so that] incoming wires which merely indicate 'from one of our
customers' shall not be accepted." Id. at *5.) Cease and Desist Order Issued Upon Consent
Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Docket Nos. 05-001-B-FR, 05-001-B-FRB
(Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors) (Feb. 1, 2005). Suspicious activities have been detected also in
respect of the New York branch of Arab Bank. Federal Branch of Arab Bank PLC, New York,
No. 2005-14, AA-EC-05-12, 2005 WL 3967697, (Dep't of the Treas., Off. of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Feb. 24, 2005).
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penalty for failing to monitor suspect transactions and making false
statements to the bank's supervisors.37 But instead of looking at the red flag
raised by the case, global banks continued in their ordinary business,
revealing what later turned out to be a regular pattern.
In late 2005, the Dutch ABN AMRO N.V. entered into an agreement
with various agencies of the U.S. government for, inter alia, violations of
economic sanctions against Iran and Libya. When, according to this
agreement, ABN AMRO paid $80 million to the U.S. government, the news
spread that the overseas branches of the bank had manipulated the
information in its transactions by concealing the SDNs involved.i38 This
technique was already too well known to the investigators to pass
unnoticed.139 In this specific regard, the agreement signed by ABN ANIRO
with the U.S. government received significant attention by the press, so that
its practice and the related treatment by U.S. authorities could hardly go
unnoticed, serving as a warning for other banks.140
In 2009 and 2012, two important settlements were entered into by nonAmerican banks regarding OFAC sanctions. The first was the London
Lloyds TSB Bank PLC, which forfeited $350 million to the DOJ and the
District Attorney for the County of New York, New York (DANY).141
Basically, Lloyds had had an internal policy of manipulating and deleting
information from payment records on behalf of SDNs since 1995.142 These
practices started to be questioned internally in 2002, after the enactment by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of Special Recommendation VII-a
key provision for fighting terrorism financing and now also a best practice
for international banking transactions-under which financial institutions
were required to ensure full information for the funds transfers and the
137. Banco de Chile, New York Branch, No. 2005-140, AA-EC-05-84, 2005 WL 3967701
(Dep't of the Treas., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, Oct. 11, 2005) (Consent Order
for Civil Money Penalty).
138. Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty, Monetary Payment and Order to File
Reports Issued Upon Consent, Docket No. 05-035-CMP-FB, 2005 WL 4158131, at *3 (Fed.
Res. Bd. of Governors, Dec. 19, 2005).
139. Danforth Newcomb, Non-U.S. Banks Are Target of Recent Economic Actions by U.S.
Government, 125 BANKING L. J. 468, 473 (2008) (noting that "the practice ...
of stripping
names from transaction documents to conceal their . . . origin ha[d] already led to recordsetting penalties ... and could lead to more in the future for the unwary"). See also Paul L. Lee,
Compliance: FurtherThoughts on a New Paradigm, 122 BANKING L. J. 291, 308 (2005) (noting the
"increasing[ ] enforcement actions" concerning amended payments).
140. Lee, Part I, supra note 1, 668.
141. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. See also Lee, Part I, supra note 1, at 669-674.
142. Settlement Agreement, supra note 96, T 6. In fact, "Lloyds removed material data from
payment messages in order to avoid detection of the involvement of OFAC-sanctioned parties
by filters used by U.S. depository institutions. This allowed transactions to be processed by
Lloyds' U.S. correspondent banks that they otherwise could have blocked for investigations, or
rejected pursuant to OFAC regulations. During the course of the conduct, Lloyds employees
commonly referred to this process as 'stripping.' Lloyds' criminal conduct was designed to
assist its clients in avoiding detection by filters employed by U.S. banks because of United
States economic sanctions .. " Exhibit A, in Lloyds DPA, supra note 96, T 2.
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related messages and to preserve such information as it related to the entire
payment chain.143 As a response, Lloyds' payment-processing unit wrongly
assumed that FATF's recommendation did not apply to them,44 and
instructed their SDN clients on how to prevent detection by OFAC filters.145
That same year, the Dutch bank ING Bank, N.V. ("ING") also entered into
several deferred prosecution agreements with the DOJ, the District Attorney
of New York, and OFAC for $619 million relating to multiple breaches of
sanctions against Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Myanmar.146
The other paramount case of an ineffective compliance function is HSBC.
In 2012 the Dutch subsidiary of British HSBC Bank ("HSBC"), together
with its affiliate HSBC Bank U.S.A., N.A., paid the DOJ and the District
Attorney of New York $1.921 billion for alleged violations of U.S. economic
143. "Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including money
remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information (name, address and
account number) on funds transfers and related messages that are sent, and the information
should remain with the transfer or related message through the payment chain. Countries
should take measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, conduct
enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds transfers which do not contain
complete originator information (name, address and account number)." FINANCIAL ACTION
TASK FORCE (FATF), FATF Special Recommendations on TerroristFinancing, in FATF IX SPECIAL
RECOMMENDATIONS 2, VII (2001). The FATF explains that the first purpose of this provision
is "to assist [appropriate law enforcement and/or prosecutorial authorities] in detecting,
investigating, prosecuting terrorists or other criminals and tracing [their] assets ...
FATF,
REVISED INTERPRETATIVE NOTE TO SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION VII: WIRE TRANSFERS 1
(2008); see also JUNJI NAKAGAWA, INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF ECONOMIC
REGULATION 309 Jonathan Bloch & Tara Cannon trans., 2011) (considering Special
Recommendation VII among the international best practices of money laundering prevention);
Anand A. Shah, The InternationalRegulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems, 3 UTRECHT L.
REv. 193, 204 (2007); COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT, COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING
AND TERRORIST FINANCING: A MODEL OF BEST PRACTICE FOR THE FINANCIAL SECTOR, THE
PROFESSIONS AND OTHER DESIGNATED BUSINESSES 151 (2005) (commenting on Special
Recommendation VII).
144. Exhibit A, in Lloyds DPA, supra note 96, T 29.
145. In 2003, Lloyds' Group Executive Committee received by the financial crime unit a
memorandum highlighting the risks associated with this practice, but again, instead of halting it,
the firm spent six months discussing the memorandum's implications. Lloyds Settlement
Agreement, supra note 96, ¶¶ 11-13.
146. See United States v. ING Bank, N. V, No. CR-12-00136 (D.D.C., June 12, 2012); Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, United States v. ING Bank, NV, No. CR-12-00136, 2012 WL
12957113 June 12, 2012) (ING Bank DPA); see also ING Bank, N.V., MUL-565595 (Dep't of
the Treas., Off. of Foreign Assets Control) (ING Bank Settlement Agreement) (June 11, 2012),
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/06122012
ing-agreement.pdf. ING Bank, N.V. was investigated by both the DOJ and the New York
District Attorney in relation to the "intentional manipulation and deletion of information about
U.S.-sanctioned parties in more than 20,000 financial and trade transactions routed through
third-party banks located in the United States between 2002 and 2007." The case involved
designated entities from Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, and Libya. Settlement Agreement between the
U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of ForeignAssets Control and ING Bank, N. V, U.S. DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY June 12, 2012, 11:47 AM), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20120612.aspx.
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sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Burma.147 In relation to this
case, the Sub-commission on Investigations of the U.S. Senate opened an
enquiry on HSBC's money laundering policy and its role in supplying
sanctioned entities with access to the U.S. financial system.148 During the
investigation, the Sub-commission provided evidence that the bank's
compliance office was aware of the violations but lacked prompt and
effective reaction.149 Like in Lloyds, HSBC's violations concerned cover
payments and instructions from and to SDNs to circumvent the U.S.
147. Under a host of deferred prosecution agreements, HSBC Bank and its affiliates agreed to
forfeit $1.256 billion to the DOJ (which satisfied $375 million assessed by OFAC), $500 million
to the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and $165 million to the Federal Reserve
Board. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. et al., No. CR-12-763 (E.D.N.Y., Dec. 11,
2012) (HSBC DPA), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecutionregistry/agreements/HSBC_1.pdf (retrieved July 12, 2017); HSBC, MUL-615225 (Dep't of the
Treas., Off. of Foreign Assets Control) (HSBC Settlement Agreement) (Dec. 11, 2012),
available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/121211
HSBCSettlement.pdf. See also Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 63 (stating that
"[tihe total value of OFAC-prohibited transactions for the period of HSBC Group's review,
from 2000 through 2006, was approximately $660 million. This includes approximately $250
million involving Sanctioned Entities in Burma; $183 million on behalf of Sanctioned Entities
in Iran; $169 million on behalf of Sanctioned Entities in Sudan; $30 million on behalf of
Sanctioned Entities in Cuba; and $28 million on behalf of Sanctioned Entities in Libya");
HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 2012-261, AA-EC-2012-140 (Dep't of the Treas., Off. of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Dec. 11, 2012) (Consent Order), available at http://www.occ.gov/
news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-1 73a.pdf; HSBC Bank USA, N.A., No. 2015063 (Dep't of the Treas., Off. of the Comptroller of the Currency, June 16, 2015) (Consent
Order for the Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/
enforcement-actions/ea20l5-063.pdf; Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued
upon Consent, Docket Nos. 12-062-CMP-FB, 12-062-CMP-HC (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors,
Dec.

11, 2012), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/

enf2012121lal.pdf; Order to Cease and Desist Issued upon Consent, Docket No. 12-062-B-FB
(Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors) (Dec. 11, 2012), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/
newsevents/press/enforcement/enf201212 11 a2.pdf.
148. "HSBC Group Compliance knew of [HSBC USA's] insistence on full transparency for ...
the practice of HSBC affiliates to conceal the Iranian transactions sent through their U.S. dollar
correspondent accounts at [HSBC USA]. HSBC Group Compliance, as well as other senior
HSBC Group executives, allowed the HSBC affiliates to continue to engage in these practices,
which even some within the bank viewed as deceptive, for more than five years without
disclosing the extent of the activity to [HSBC USA, N.A.]. The bank documents show that,
from 2000 to 2005, the practice of altering . .. documentation was repeatedly brought to the

attention of HSBC Group Compliance, including by [HSBC Europe] personnel who objected
to participating in the alteration of documents and twice announced deadlines to end the
activity. Despite receiving this information, HSBC Group Compliance did not stop HSBC

affiliates from sending concealed Iranian transactions through [HSBC USA's] accounts until the
bank decided to exit Iran altogether in 2007." PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS,
U.S.

SENATE, U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING,

DRUGS, AND TERRORIST

FINANCING: HSBC CASE HISTORY 114 (July 17, 2012) (U.S. Senate Subcomm. Rep.).

149. Id.; see also Christopher Wieman, Money Laundering, 52 Am. CRII. L. REV. 1357, 138-82
(2015) (discussing the penalties applied to HSBC and BNPP and "their role in money
laundering schemes").
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government's filters.is0 At the time, HSBC's compliance function was so
dramatically understaffed, basically for cost-saving purposes,"' that only
four employees were supposed to review the 13,000 to 15,000 suspicious
transactions that the bank carried out every month.152
All attempts by the bank to remedy or regulate compliance projects failed
miserably. For example, in 2003 HSBC auditors raised with the compliance
office the question of certain transactions with Iran that reported the
ordering party as "selves."53 The compliance office opened an investigation
and found that the purpose of this practice was to prevent OFAC's
intervention and to circumvent the filters in place.'54 HSBC management,
however, refused to implement the internal protocol the compliance office
created to ensure the complete disclosure of suspect transactions.'55
Moreover, in 2005, HSBC's compliance office adopted a new global
compliance policy that prohibited corporate officials from performing
transactions that were subject to OFAC sanctions.156

Such a general

prohibition was nevertheless accompanied by a series of exceptions that
ultimately hindered the effective respect of OFAC mandates, allowing the
continuation of the covering practice as a result.57 Also, the policy was
intended to apply only to U.S. dollar transactions but continued to allow the
execution of non-U.S. dollar business with countries and persons that were
prohibited according to the OFAC list.58 Finally, to address the risk of
infringing U.S. laws notwithstanding the new policy, HSBC suggested to
discuss with clients verbally, avoiding leaving any written record.159 Despite
the attempts to strengthen the internal compliance policy, from 2001 to
2007 HSBC processed approximately 25,000 OFAC sensitive transactions
150. Lee, Part II, supra note 1, at 737. According to the Statement of Facts attached to the
DPA, HSBC failed to conduct the due diligence on suspicious transactions by setting the related
monitoring system (called Customer Account Monitoring Program, "CAMP") in a way to
detect only high-risk transactions, so that $200 trillion in wire transfers from 2006 to 2009 went
totally undetected. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 17.
151. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 26 (mentioning the management's "desire
to save costs").
152. Id. T 27 (adding that "[iun contrast, following remedial measures undertaken by HSBC,
HSBC Bank USA currently has approximately 430 employees reviewing suspicious wire
alerts").
153. HSBC Settlement Agreement, supra note 147, T 6.
154. Id.
155. Lee, Part II, supra note 1, 739.
156. S. K. Green, GCL 050047 - Compliance with Sanctions (Jul. 28, 2005), in EXHIBITS
HEARING ON U.S. VULNERABILITIES TO MONEY LAUNDERING, DRUGs 339 (2012), available at
goo.gl/1uH7MF.
157. See HSBC Settlement Agreement, supra note 147, T 8; see also U.S. Senate Subcomm.
Rep., supra note 149, at 156 (noting that the new compliance policy "allowed HSBC affiliates to
continue to use cover payments when sending them through U.S. accounts for processing,
which meant the transactions would continue to circumvent the OFAC filter and any
individualized review by the recipient U.S. bank, including [HSBC U.S.]").
158. U.S. Senate Subcomm. Rep., supra note 149, at 156.
159. Id. at 157 ("[v]erbal discussions with affected clients would be preferable").
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with Iran, amounting to $19.4 billion.160 Of these figures, more than eightyfive percent were undisclosed.161
Understaffing was another serious and enduring problem for HSBC. The
DOJ strongly reproached HSBC in this respect.1 62 In 2009, the bank
underwent an examination by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), that recommended an increase in the compliance personnel.163 A
few months later, however, the U.S. HSBC Director for Specialized
Compliance announced that HSBC was still not compliant with OFAC
regulations.164 In 2011, another report from the OCC found deficiencies in
HSBC worldwide with its OFAC compliance program that was due to the
lack of information sharing within the group.1 65 The DPA makes clear that
at the level of HSBC Holdings, "a philosophy of 'HSBC does not "air the
dirty linen of one affiliate with another"' defined the approach to
compliance."166

All these cases clearly illustrate that, while the compliance officers of the
targeted banks were fully aware of the violations of U.S. economic sanctions,
they either failed to act for lack of implementation of the warnings from
management or sided with the latter in covering OFAC-sensitive
transactions. Either way, the consequences for the banks have been
disastrous. Besides having to admit their failures and pay large amounts to
the U.S. government, these banks were also obliged to re-engineer their
compliance function to meet U.S. standards and practices, marking
eventually the hegemony of the United States in the field of compliance.
III.

Correcting Compliance Failures through American Law

This Part examines the reforms that the targeted banks put into place as a
result of the agreements entered into with the U.S. government. Even
though many of these developments are still ongoing and under a
monitoring process, it is fair to say that such reforms changed the structure
and philosophy underlying compliance offices of non-American banks
(section A). Moreover, it seems plausible to claim that an Americanization
of compliance, although still embryonic, is currently underway. Indeed, if
European bank Deutsche Bank is reported to have formed the first
compliance department of a bank in 1992, the current processes and
160. Id. at 166.
161. Id.
162. Memorandum and Order, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and HSBC Holdings PLC
at 17, No. CR-12-763 (July 1, 2013) (HSBC Order) (stating that "HSBC Bank USA failed to
provide adequate staffing and other resources to maintain an effective [anti-money laundering]
program").
163. U.S. Senate Subcomm. Rep., supra note 149, at 181.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 182.
166. HSBC Order, supra note 162, at 17.
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structure of the compliance function of European banks are shaped mostly
by American regulatory requirements and sanctions (section B).167
A.

CORPORATE COMPLIANCE OF FOREIGN BANKS AND

DPAs

To see how largely corporate compliance of foreign banks is affected by
U.S. economic sanctions, let it suffice to mention that, pursuant to-or as a
condition for-the agreements they entered into with the U.S. prosecutors,
those sanctioned non-American banks have had to restructure and
reorganize their whole compliance policies and processes in line with
American law. As Peter Kurer reports, a number of banks involved in
criminal prosecutions had to agree, as part of a DPA or a similar agreement,
to a structural separation of the legal and compliance function.168 Indeed,
corporate compliance has become an organizational structure of
corporations whose regulation stems not simply from the law applicable to
corporate matters but also from agreements with the governmental agencies
themselves. In fact, the various DPAs entered into with the DOJ commit
firms to heavy burdens in terms of restructuring, staffing, and empowering
their compliance officers.
The most relevant example in this respect is the DPA concluded between
HSBC and the DOJ.169 In reaching an agreement, the DOJ took into
consideration, among other factors, HSBC's extensive actions-for which it
spent over $290 million-to remedy the bank's failures in money laundering
policy.170 As stated in the Agreement, HSBC Bank USA and HSBC Group's
management undertook significant efforts to improve "tone from the top"
and "ensur[e] that a culture of compliance" gains traction within the
institution.'7' These efforts aimed at improving the bank's money
laundering and OFAC compliance programs.1 72 As we will show, the
adopted remedial measures aimed at reforming its compliance programs
involved deep changes in the company's structure and organization.173
167. Christoph E. Hauschka, Grundlagen der Compliance-Organisation,in IN-HOUSE COUNSEL
205 (Sylvie Hambloch-Gessin et al. eds., 2010).
168. Kurer, supra note 73, at 146.
169. See generally supra notes 147-166.
170. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 81.
17 1. Id.
172. Id. These considerations are in line with the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines under which the
existence of an effective compliance program may lead to preclude a criminal prosecution or in
any case to a sentence downgrade if the company is convicted for a crime perpetrated by one of
its agents. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2016); see
also Philip A. Wellner, Effective Compliance Programs and Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 27
CARDOzo L. REv. 497 (2006).
173. Richard Gruner once predicted that the development of compliance programs would
broaden the function and influence of the Chief Legal Officer (CLO) within the corporation.
See Richard S. Gruner, General Counsel in an Era of Compliance Programs, 46 EMORY LJ. 1113,
1113-16 (1997). In this article we observe that the compliance reforms corporations implement
in the follow-up of DPAs together with a dramatic shift to a risk approach in addressing legal
IN INTERNATIONALEN UNTERNHEMEN 205,
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Regarding staffing, HSBC North America and HSBC Holdings appointed
a new leadership team and, for the latter, even a new CEO, Chairman, Chief
Legal Officer, and Head of Global Standards Assurance.7 Moreover, "[a]s
a result of its [money laundering] violations and program deficiencies,
HSBC North America and HSBC Bank USA 'clawed back' deferred
compensation (bonuses) for a number of their most senior [anti-money
laundering] and compliance officers, to include the Chief Compliance
Officer, [anti-money laundering] Director and Chief Executive Officer."175

In line with these developments, HSBC Group also restructured its bonus
system according to accomplishment of compliance targets. 7 6 Indeed,
global standards, notably risk and compliance measures, were given a
minimum weight of twenty-five percent in the scorecard used to assess
performance of HSBC's Group management board members.177
Furthermore, the DOJ took into account the tenfold increase of HSBC
Bank USA's anti-money laundering staffing, which went from ninety-two
full-time employees and twenty-five consultants in January 2010 to
approximately 880 full-time employees and 267 consultants in May 2012.178
HSBC Group also appointed new senior officers. "Eighteen of the top
twenty-one most senior officers" were hired "since the beginning of
2011."179 By 2014, HSBC Group counted 7,000 employees working in risk
and compliance, which is around ten percent of the bank's total staff.18o This
example was followed by other European banks such ING,181 Standard

Chartered,182 and CommerzBank,183 which also agreed to remedial
recruitment as part of the DPA with the U.S. prosecution authorities.
concerns have diminished the CLO function and empowered the CCO's scope of action and
autonomy.
174. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, at 27, 29.
175. Id. T 81(b).
176. Id. T 81(b, e-g).
177. HSBC, HSBC REMUNERATION PRACTICES AND GOVERNANCE 5-6 (2018), available at
https://goo.gl/E3Wcwb (stating also that "[r]isk and compliance is a critical part of the
performance rating and variable pay assessment process").
178. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 81(d).
179. Id. T 81 (g).
180. Margot Patrick, HSBC Third-QuarterEarnings: Key Takeaways, THE WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 3, 2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/11/03/hsbc-third-quarter-earnings-keytakeaways/.

181. Dutch bank ING agreed in its DPA to expand its compliance program and double the
number of staff in the compliance risk management function. See United States v. ING Bank,
N.V, No. CR-12-00136 (D.D.C., June 12, 2012) T 74(a).
182. British Bank Standard Chartered agreed to "[s]ubstantially increasing personnel and
resources devoted to sanctions compliance." See United States v. Standard CharteredBank, No.
CR-00-262, T 107(b) (D.D.C., Dec. 10, 2012) (Standard Chartered DPA).
183. CommerzBank's Global Head of Compliance acknowledged a shortage of compliance
personnel in Frankfurt to deal with requests for information worldwide. As a consequence, the
bank has since more than doubled its U.S. based compliance staff. See United States v.
CommerzBank AG, CommerzBankAG New York Branch, No. CR-00-031, ¶ 86 (D.D.C., Mar. 12,
2015).
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Regarding structural transformations, HSBC Group converted the Head
of HSBC Group Compliance position to a Group General Manager and
replaced the individual serving as Head of HSBC Group Compliance,
assigning him with new responsibilities, such as the direct oversight over
every compliance officer globally.84 As a consequence, accountability,
reporting lines and escalation now lead to and stem from the HSBC group
compliance.85 Finally, these transformations have been accompanied with
the hire of more senior personnel. For instance, the Head of HSBC Group
Compliance is nowadays one of the fifty most senior employees at HSBC
globally.186
Moreover, the compliance function was modified with the aim of giving it
a "stronger voice," "real independence" and an "effective enterprise-wide
compliance risk management program."s? In this sense, HSBC has
undertaken to implement uniform compliance global standards,ss and has
reorganized its U.S.-based anti-money laundering department. For
instance, material or systemic anti-money laundering control that is contrary
to its global standards and is "reported by the Regional and Global Business
Compliance heads are now shared with all other Regional and Global
Business Compliance heads facilitating horizontal information sharing."189
Through this reform, HSBC gave to compliance the voice and authority it
was previously lacking.
If it is true that the organization of the compliance function varies widely
across industries and even within the banking industry itself, HSBC's
reforms were clearly designed to strengthen the reporting structure and to
elevate the status of compliance within the institution, as per the
recommendations and agreements reached in the DPA.190 In particular,
184. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 81(e-f).
185. Id.
186. Id. T 81(e).
187. "Other lessons initially identified in the case studies in Part I are affirmed by the case
studies in Part II. The need for a stronger 'voice' for the compliance function is affirmed by
virtually every case study in Part II as is the need for real independence of the compliance
function. Another lesson learned from the case studies in Part II is the importance of an
effective enterprise-wide compliance risk management program. In several cases, for example,
the Dubai offices of foreign banks appeared to be running their own operations aiding Iranian
banks. In other cases, admittedly, the Dubai offices were simply using the same procedures that
were codified in head office operating manuals. In still other cases, the head office of a foreign
bank promulgated a directive on OFAC compliance, but with little follow-up to determine
whether the directive was in fact being observed in its various offices. An empowered role for
the compliance function is one that the international supervisory bodies have declaimed for
more than a decade." Lee, Part II, supra note 1, at 766.
188. Attachment A, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 81(c).
189. Id. T 81(h).
190. Most banks have today strong independent compliance organizations but that reporting
lines are not always uniform. Indeed, the institutional answer to the question as to whom
should the chief compliance officer (CCO) report, or the chief legal officer if the functions are
not fully separate, varies widely. The possibilities include reporting to the chief executive
officer (CEO), the audit committee, the chief operating officer (COO), the chief risk officer

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
2018]

U.S. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

529

HSBC implemented these reforms by: "(i) separating the legal and
compliance departments; (ii) requiring that the anti-money laundering
Director report directly to the Chief Compliance Officer; and (iii) providing
that the [anti-money laundering] Director regularly report directly to the
Board and senior management about [HSBC's] .

.

. anti-money laundering

...
program."191 Finally, following the footsteps of American commercial
banks such as Citibank and Wells Fargo, HSBC's CCO now reports directly
to the Chief Risk Officer (CRO), instead of the Chief Legal Officer
(CLO).192

The case of BNPP represents another example of the Americanization of
compliance, whereby the bank made changes in the organization and
processes of its office and programs after facing criminal prosecution in the
United States. Under a separate Memorandum of Understanding with the
New York State Department of Financial Services (NYDFS), BNPP
undertook "to install an independent consultant . .. on site at the New York
Branch to conduct a review of the . . . OFAC compliance programs, policies

and procedures in place at the Branch."193 Moreover, a cease and desist
order issued by the Federal Reserve and the French financial authority
(Autorit6 de Contr6le Prudentiel et de R6solution) engaged the bank to
submit "an acceptable compliance program, including the names of key
managers and a timetable for implementation, to ensure compliance with the
OFAC Regulations by BNP Paribas's global business lines."194 Additionally,
under a separate cease and desist order, the French bank was prohibited
from re-employing as a consultant certain individuals who took part in the
(CRO), or directly to the board if the CCO sits on the executive body at the same level of the
chief legal officer. By way of example, Kurer shows that in JP Morgan the CCO reports to the
COO, in UBS to the CRO and in Goldman Sachs to the board. Kurer, supra note 73, at 143.
In a broader and separate study across industries, Tanina Rostain provides empirical data about
the reporting lines of CLOs. She notes that if most general counsels continue to report to the
CEO, an increasing number of them now report to the CFO, which is sometimes seen as a
disadvantage. Indeed, this precludes direct access to the board through the formal structure of
the corporation and compels CLOs to use informal networks to get their message across to the
board. See Tanina Rostain, General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and
New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 465, 473 (2008). In our view, these
evolutions together point to the fact that in the short term CCOs will gain a more preponderant
role in corporate management to the detriment of CLOs.
191. HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 5(e).
192. Kurer, supra note 73, at 143. These cases contradict the earlier findings of Tanina Rostain
who observed in her case studies that CCOs generally report to CLOs, except, of course, when
the CLO combines both functions. See Rostain, supra note 190, at 481.
193. BNP Paribas, S.A. New York Branch, T 56 (N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Servs., June 30, 2014)
(Consent Order Under New York Banking Law § 44), available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/
ea/eal40630.pdf.
194. Cease and Desist Order Issued Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act § 1, Docket No. 14-022-B-FB, at 4-5, (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors & Autorit6 de
Contrdle Prudentiel et de Resolution) (June 30, 2014), available at https://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20140630a2.pdf.
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violations of U.S. economic sanctions.195 This latter situation brings to mind
the case of ING Bank, N.V., which agreed with the DOJ to implement, as a
remedial measure, the institution of disciplinary proceedings against more
than sixty employees involved in the violation of U.S. economic sanctions.196
B.

THE COMPLIANCE MONITOR AND THE AMERICANIZATION OF
COMPLIANCE OFFICES

In the new cooperative model of prosecuting violations to U.S. economic
sanctions, monitoring has become an essential part of the process of
improving corporate compliance programs. It is the only mechanism that
allows confirming that the conditions contained within the agreements with
the U.S. government have been met and that future violation will not take
place. For this reason, as a condition of a DPA or a conditional discharge in
plea agreements, the DOJ and United States' Attorneys often demand a
monitor to oversee the company's compliance with U.S. anti-money
laundering laws and U.S. sanctions laws.197 Some banks, such as BNPP and
HSBC, were subjected to post-settlement independent monitoring for
several years.
In the plea agreement, BNPP agreed as a requirement to its conditional
discharge to pay and hire a monitor imposed by the Federal Reserve or the
DFS for a period of three years.1 98 This monitor would communicate to the
DANY any report filed with the Federal Reserve or DFS.199 Similarly, after
signing the settlement with HSBC, the DOJ appointed former New York
County prosecutor Michael Cherkasky to be HSBC Compliance Monitor
for a period of five years at the expenses of the bank. Mr. Cherkasky was
tasked to "evaluate .

.

. the effectiveness of the internal controls, policies and

procedures of HSBC Holdings and its subsidiaries."200 He filed his first fullyear report with the DOJ in January 2015:
195. Order to Cease and Desist and Order of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty Issued
Upon Consent Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as Amended § 2, Docket Nos.
14-022-B-FB, 14-022-CMP-FB, (Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors) (June 30, 2014), available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/enf20140630al.pdf.
196. As a result, "[s]eventeen of those employees were disciplined for their conduct with a
reprimand or sanction letter; three were forced to retire; and seven were terminated. Several
employees under scrutiny left the bank before disciplinary decisions had been rendered."
Exhibit A, in ING Bank DPA, supra note 146, T 74(b).
197. See, e.g., HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 9, at 15.
198. See Plea Agreement, supra note 112, ¶¶ 11-12.
199. See id.
200. Attachment B, in HSBC DPA, supra note 147, T 1; see also Lee, Part II, supra note 1, at 742
(stating that "HSBC was required to retain an independent monitor acceptable to the DOJ to
oversee its compliance with U.S. anti-money laundering laws and U.S. sanctions laws for five
years"). A few months later, the DOJ filed with the district court the name of Michael
Cherkasky as "independent compliance monitor for HSBC Holdings plc." Letter from the U.S.
Attorney's Office to Judge John Gleeson, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. and HSBC
Holdings plc, No. CR-12-763 (E.D.N.Y., June 5, 2013), available at http://www.complinet.com/
net file store/new editorial/l/e/Letter_-_HSBC.pdf.
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The critical, 1,000-page report, which summarizes HSBC's first year
under a court-appointed monitor, raises doubts about how effective the
government's use of deferred and non-prosecution agreements is in
reining in wrongdoing and changing culture at the world's largest
banks.... The report cites a litany of problems with the bank's reforms
and compliance procedures, finding that the pace of change is
inadequate, said the people, who asked not to be named because the
report isn't public. In at least one instance, a bank manager shouted at
an internal auditor who was critical of his work. In another example,
the monitor discovered that documents justifying a decision to resolve a
client alert were created after the fact although they were presented as
being contemporaneous. Meanwhile, controls in countries with high
levels of financial risk, such as Oman and the Philippines, are
inadequate, according to the people.201
Therefore, while DPAs are on the rise, the next challenge for U.S.
authorities lies in having a transparent and effective monitoring system.
Indeed, as Professor Garrett explains, "[k]eeping implementation of
corporate deals in the dark" may in the end "harm H the process
immeasurably."202 In his view, the criticisms of lenient deals with banks in
particular have made clear that compliance is problematic and, therefore,
that "the efforts of monitors, whether successful or not, [are] all the more
crucial to the public interest."203

Another emerging concern regarding corporate monitors lies in the extent
of their powers inside the corporation. In the exercise of their monitoring
role, they have already become the "Trojan horses" shaping the compliance
function of foreign banks in accordance with U.S. regulatory standards. But
their effective mandate goes well beyond that monitoring function.204 As a
U.S. district judge noticed, a corporate monitor "now acts not only as
201. Greg Farrell, HSBC Falls Short on Compliance, Monitor Said to Report, BLOOMBERG (March
30, 2015, 2:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-30/hsbc-falls-shorton-compliance-monitor-said-to-report.
Regarding the publicity of monitor's report, the
question is now being discussed before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2015, Hubert
Dean Moore wrote a letter to Judge John Gleeson asking to see a copy of the HSBC monitor
report arguing that the public has the same right to see a compliance monitor's report tracking
HSBC's efforts to combat money laundering as it would a plea deal. After the Judge ruled the
release of the report-with redactions-both HSBC and the DOJ appealed that decision. The
Appeals Court is currently examining the submissions. See The Battle to Make the HSBC Monitor
Report a Public Document, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER (Nov. 15, 2016, 12:17 PM), available at
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/2 00/the-battle-to-make-the-hsbc-monitorreport-public/. See also Brandon Garret, The Public Interest in CorporateMonitorships: The HSBC
Case, OXFORD Bus. L. BLOG (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/
blog/2016/11/public-interest-corporate-monitorships-hsbc-case (agreeing with the judge's
analysis and highlighting the public interest in corporate monitorships generally).
202. Garret, supra note 201.
2 0 3. Id.
204. Monitors "are charged primarily with monitoring compliance with the relevant settlement
agreement, [and they] are also tasked with overseeing and, sometimes even implementing, the
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. [may cause] vast
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corporate

governance."205

Actually, corporate monitors might act either as simple corporate
supervisors or, more proactively, as agents of change, impacting the work of
boards of directors and of top managers on a daily basis. More than the fact
of having access to the corporation's entire property, information, and
documents, which is granted to them by the settlement agreements,
corporate monitors are entitled to inform the prosecutors of any breach of
the settlement agreement or additional violation of law-a task that enlarges
their role considerably. Obviously, with the increasing practice of
agreements with the DOJ and other enforcement agencies, the powers of the
monitors have been strengthened proportionally, to the point that some
scholars have dubbed them as "the new corporate czar[s]," whose powers
exceed even those of CEOs and board of directors.206
In targeted firms, compliance is now designed according to the American
conception of the corporate task. Indeed, the firms that reform their
compliance pursuant to the instructions of U.S. government de facto
introduce a peculiarly American element in their corporate practice. As the
French professional monitor Laurent Cohen-Tanugi states in this respect:
The culture shock, and indeed, the conflict of laws created by the
confrontation of non-American persons with these realities has nothing
to do with an extraterritorial application of American law, but
underscores the necessity for corporations and executives doing
business in the United States to be thoroughly familiar with the rules of
the game and the country's legal culture.207
As a consequence, an Americanization of compliance functions and related
executive positions in foreign banks is underway. As such, only three of the
ten largest European banks by total assets 208 employ a compliance officer,
compliance committee chairman or head of compliance with no training or
process necessary for making whole those that the organization's misconduct has injured."
Veronica Root, Modern-Day Monitorships, 33 YALE J. REG 109, 127 (2016).
205. Security Exchange Commission v. Worldcom, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 431, 432 (S.D.N.Y., July 7,
2003).
206. See generally Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The
New Corporate Czar?, 105 MicH. L. REv. 1713, 1727 (2006).
207. Cohen-Tanugi,supra note 4, at 6.
208. The ten largest European Banks by assets are said to be in descending order: HSBC, BNP
Paribas, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Societe Generale, Banco Santander, Groupe
BPCE, Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). The first seven are also part of the twenty
largest banks worldwide. Their global headquarters are located in four different countries:
France (4), United Kingdom (4), Germany (1), and Spain (1). See Top 100 Banks in the World,
BANKS AROUND THE WORLD, http://www.relbanks.com/worlds-top-banks/assets (last updated
Apr. 2, 2018) (listing the largest banks in Europe and worldwide).
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previous experience in the United States whatsoever,209 namely Soci&6
G6n6rale,210 BNP Paribas,211 and RBS212. The Americanization of the
compliance offices of foreign companies expands even beyond banks and
includes other industries and legal services. French transport giant Alstom,
which recently struck a multi-million-dollar deal for its power business with
American company General Electric, restructured its compliance office and
hired a fully trained American lawyer as CCO.213 Similarly, the Paris office
of New York-based law firm Debevoise & Plimpton hired former U.S.
Federal prosecutor and Columbia trained lawyer Frederick T. Davis to work
on compliance cases involving European corporations.214
Regardless of the undisputable Americanization of the compliance
functions and the adoption of American compliance policies by non209. In HSBC, the Chief Legal Officer, Stuart Levey, was a Principal Associate Deputy
Attorney General at the U.S. Department of Justice. Stuart Levey, HSBC, www.goo.gl/
ZFpqQF (last visited June 25, 2018). The Chief Risk Officer, Marc Moses, who is also
responsible for compliance, previously worked for American bank JP Morgan. Marc Moses,
HSBC, www.goo.gl/ZgjsZ2 (last visited June 25, 2018). The compliance officers of Deutsche
Bank have held several positions in New York. See Deutsche Bank names new Global Head of
Compliance and new Global Head ofAnti-Financial Crime, DEUTSCHE BANK, www.goo.gl/kjJdXb
(last visited June 25, 2018); Michael Roemer, BARCLAYS, www.goo.gl/AmbtL4 (last visited June
25, 2018); Groupe BPCE :JacquesBeyssade rejoint le comitide direction ginirale du GroupeBPCE en
qualitidedirecteur giniraladjoint, ZONEBOURSE (Feb. 10, 2016, 4:20 PM), www.goo.gl/4dBJAZ;
Matthew Elderfield appointed Head of Group Compliance, NORDEA (May 16, 2010, 10:10 AM),
www.goo.gl/E6B2dV. At Banco Santander the Risk Supervision, Regulation and Compliance
Committee is led by independent director Bruce Neil Carnegie-Brown, British national, with
an extensive experience in the U.S., working eighteen years at JPMorgan Chase and four years
at Bank of America. Mr Bruce Carnegie-Brown, SANTANDER, www.goo.gl/zkzWsd (last visited
June 25, 2018). Finally, Credit Agricole has a dedicated executive risk committee to survey risks
associated with U.S. Regulation. Frangoise Gri leads the Risk Committee in the United States,
whereas the CCO is the HEC-trained manager Jean-Pierre Tremebert. Franfoise Gri, CREDIT
AGRICOLE, www.goo.gl/PNfsps (last updated Mar. 2018); jean-Pierre Trimebert, CREDIT
AGRICOLE, www.goo.gl/waz7uB (last updated Nov. 2015).
210. Edouard-Malo Henry, Group Head of Compliance at Societe Generale, was entirely
trained in France and has a wide range of experience in compliance functions in Canada and
Europe. Edouard-Malo Henry, SOCIETE GENERALE, https://www.societegenerale.com/en/
content/edouard-malo-henry (last visited June 25, 2018).
211. In BNP Paribas, Nathalie Hartmann is the current Head of Compliance and has not
worked or received training in the United States. The General Management and the Executive
Committee, BNP PARIBAS, https://group.bnpparibas/en/group/governance-compliance/generalmanagement-executive-committee/nathalie-hartmann (last visited June 25, 2018).
212. Jon Pain, Chief conduct and regulatory affairs officer RBS, is a former regulator of the
U.K. Financial Services Authority, with extensive experience in compliance matters. But he has
no training or experience in the United States. See Philip Aldrick, RBS Names Former FSA Man
as Head of Conduct, THE TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://goo.gl/Xo3qPA.
213. Alstom Transport restructured entirely its legal and compliance departments. Michael A.
Julian, a West Virginia University College of Law graduate, now leads the compliance
department. Michael Julian, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-julian-6316ba8/
?ppe=1 (last visited June 25, 2018).
214. See Frederick T. Davis, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, https://www.debevoise.com/frederick
davis?tab=biography (last visited June 25, 2018).
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American banks, it seems still premature to affirm that an irreversible
"Americanization of compliance" has taken place. In order to be able to
affirm this, it would be necessary to examine the commitment of sanctioned
companies to genuinely fix their long-term compliance programs through
American law, and discard the idea that they may be implementing, in haste,
"provisional amendments" just to give the impression of honoring
commitments entered into through their respective agreements. 215
In other words, we have to be clear that it has been less than a decade
since this new wave of bank prosecutions entered the scene. Only time,
through a transparent, effective and public monitoring system, will tell
whether DPAs are proper tools for deterring bank corruption. In this regard,
we could say that Americanization of compliance is expected to be for
foreign banks what rehabilitation is for individuals.
Conclusion
This article explores the dynamics surrounding the enforcement of U.S.
economic sanctions vis-i-vis the compliance function of non-American
banks. By exploiting its powerful legal arsenal and through a strategic use of
the settlement agreements made available by prosecutorial practice, the U.S.
government has put pressure on foreign banks to subject themselves to heavy
commitments that profoundly reshape their compliance functions. These
reform efforts represent an indispensable way to both avoid an increase in
the sanctions and prevent "spectacular failures in compliance" from
replicating in the future. By doing so, targeted banks have inaugurated a
new practice of compliance under which U.S. laws become an integral part
of the function itself, gradually setting American laws as the main framework
to design the compliance structure and processes of foreign banks.
The considerations that led foreign banks to settle and the preventive aim
that lies behind the reform efforts potentially apply also to foreign
corporations in industries other than banking. There is no reason to believe
that the U.S. government might not decide, at a certain point, to exercise its
extremely broad discretion by starting a criminal investigation against
foreign corporations outside the banking or financial system in general, as it
is already doing with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In this respect, we
suggest that in-house counsel and compliance officers start taking into
account the possibility of adopting, as their internal regulations, numerous
principles derived from compliance practices that we have highlighted
215. Garrett states in this respect that "[i]t is not clear that these banks are being rehabilitated
through compliance terms either. These terms aim to prevent future crimes in a way that the
payment of fines-ultimately borne by the shareholders-may not accomplish. We know little
about how the compliance terms of prosecution agreements are being implemented, since the
process is rarely described publicly by companies or prosecutors, and the reports of independent
monitors who are sometimes tasked with supervising compliance are typically not made public."
Brandon L. Garret, The Rise of Bank Prosecutions, 126 YALE LJ. FORUM 33, 43 (2016), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2811121.
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earlier in this article, such as separating the legal and compliance offices and
strengthening the contacts and interaction between the compliance officers
and the corporation's top leadership in order to ensure the independence of
compliance officers and the effectiveness of their work. Such reforms, which
of course will never take place without the support of the corporation's top
management and directors, might bring positive results in case of
investigation, allowing the targeted corporations to gain more leniency
against violations of U.S. economic sanctions laws. At any rate, the coming
years should reveal if other companies will also restructure their compliance
offices before the heavy burden of the global U.S. regulatory power falls
upon them.
Finally, one wonders who may benefit from these reforms. Certainly, in
terms of hegemonic influence over corporate behaviors, the U.S.
government would see its power increased on a global scale. But the
Americanization of corporate compliance might also benefit corporate
actors, decreasing the risk of compliance failures in the future and making
transactions safer in the interests of their clients and suppliers. If banks and
other corporate actors wish to continue to participate in the American
financial markets, they must abide by U.S. laws. The rules of the game have
changed, and now is the moment to adjust.
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